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This study analyses the  liberalisation of capital movements  in Europe  from  the 
perspective  of  both  the  European  Community  in  general  and  Greece  in 
particular. 
Part  I  presents  the  prevailing  situation  in  the  Community  and  the  current 
Commission  proposals for  the full  liberalisation of  capital movements.  Both 
the  benefits  and  risks  of  the  liberalisation are  assessed.  It is stressed 
that the  abolition of  exchange  controls  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  additional 
harmonization  and  coordinating  measures  in  the  fields  of  financial 
supervision,  taxation,  and  monetary  policy.  Otherwise,  the major  Community 
objective of  creating a  totally integrated  European  financial  area may  not  be 
attained.  It  is  also  pointed  out  that  the  liberalisation  process  entails 
risks  for  the  less  prosperous  Member  States.  These  risks  would  have  to  be 
tackled  if  the  social  and  economic  cohesion  of  the  Community  is  to  be 
safeguarded  and  indeed  strengthened. 
Part  II  starts with  an  account  of  the  economic  problems  and  performance  of 
Greece,  which  apart  from  providing  the  necessary  background  information  to 
those  not  fami 1  iar  with  the  Greek  economy,  also  highlights  the  economic 
weaknesses  of  the  country  which  might  create  serious  obstacles  to  the 
relaxation of existing controls on  capital movements.  It then focuses  on  the 
possible  effects  of  the  liberalisation  on  the  Greek  economy  and  its 
implications for  economic  policy.  The  study concludes  with certain  economic 
policy  recommendations,  which  - if  implemented  - are  expected  to  help  the 
Greek  economy  not  only to comply  with  Community  rules in this field,  but  also 
to  correct  existing  macroeconomic  imbalances  which  create  uncertainty, 
discourage productive  investment,  and  hamper  economic  growth. 
The  study  has been  prepared  by  Christina Mitsouli,  a  Robert  Schuman  Scholar, 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Directorate  General  for  Research  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  further to  a  request  made  by  Mr  G.  ROMEOS,  Vice-President of 
the European  Parliament. 
- 3  -Any  opinions  and  recommendations  contained  in  this  study  are  those  of  the 
author.  They  are not necessarily those of this Directorate General,  or of the 
European  Parliament or any  of its organs or Members. 
- 4  -
David  Millar 
Director Table of Contents 
PARI  I: 
THE  LIBERALISATION  OF  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS  AND  THE  CREATION 
OF  AN  INTEGRATED  FINANCIAL  AREA  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
1 .  The  international context ..........•..............•....... 
2.  Measures  for the free movement  of capital in the Community 
2. 1 Basic  concepts ......................................•. 
2.2 The  Treaty of Rome  and  the Directives of  1960  and  1962 
2.3  The  1970s:  the reinforcement  of exchange  controls ..... 
2.4 The  revival of  interest in the liberalisation of 
capital movements ....................................  . 
2.5 Exchange  controls in the Member  States ...............  . 
3.  Arguments  for the  liberalisation of capital movements ..... 
4.  Difficulties and  risks in the liberalisation of capital 
movements ................................................  . 
4.1  Obstacles  in the field of financial services .........  . 
4.2 Fiscal  issues ........................................  . 
4.3  Risks  for the stability of the EMS ...................  . 
4.4 Risks for the  less prosperous Member  States ..........  . 
PART  II: 
THE  LIBERALISATION  OF  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS  AND  GREECE 
1 .  The  Greek  economy ........................................  . 
1.1  General  macroeconomic  policy and  performance .........  . 
1.2 Exchange  rate policy .................................  . 
1.3 The  financial sector .................................  . 
- 5  -
7 
9 
14 
14 
16 
17 
18 
20 
25 
28 
28 
30 
31 
33 
37 
39 
39 
45 
47 2.  The  Greek  economy  in the light of the  liberalisation of 
capital movements  in the Community .......................  . 
2.1  The  arguments  for the  imposition of controls on 
capital outflows .....................................  . 
2.2  The  effectiveness and  efficiency of controls on 
capital outflows .....................................  . 
2.3 The  liberalisation of outward  capital movements: 
possible effects and  implications for economic  policy. 
3.  Preconditions for proceeding towards  the further  liberalisation 
of capital movements .....................................  . 
Notes  and  references .........................................  . 
Annex ........................................................  . 
Bibliography .................................................  . 
- 6  -
56 
56 
57 
60 
75 
79 
89 
105 PART  I  : 
THE  LIBERALISATION  OF  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS  AND  THE  CREATION  OF  AN  INTEGRATED 
FINANCIAL  AREA  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
- 7  -1  !he international context 
The  recent  increase  in  the  value  assigned  to  the  liberalisation  of  capital 
movements  within  the  Community  and  to  the  creation  of  an  integrated European 
financial  area  is closely related  to  the  structural  changes  occurring  in  the 
international  financial  system.  International  developments  have  forced  EEC 
Member  States  to  recognize  that  exchange  controls  are  losing  their 
effectiveness,  and  prompted  them  to  search  for  new  ways  to  strengthen  the 
position  of  European  capital  markets  in  the  world  financial  system.  It 
follows  that  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  various  issues  involved  in 
European  financial  integration,  it  is  necessary  to  be  aware  of  the 
international context within which  integration is taking place.  Therefore,  it 
would  be  useful  to  start  with  a  brief  assessment  of  changes  in  the 
international  financial  system,  their causes  and  their  implications  for  the 
Member  States of the Community
1
• 
During  the  last  fifteen  years,  the  economic  significance  and  institutional 
framework  of  international  financial  operations  have  undergone  profound 
change. 
The  role of  international financial  operations in financing trade,  investment, 
government  expenditure  and  balance  of  payments  deficits  has  become  very 
important.  This  is shown  by  the growth  of  international banking activities as 
well  as by  the expansion  of securities and  equities markets.  During  the last 
ten years,  activity in  the  major  financial  markets  expanded  at  a  more  rapid 
rate than real output  in the major  industrial countries. 
The  internationalization  and  integration  of  financial  markets  has  increased 
considerably.  This  has  been  reflected  in  the  faster  growth  of  offshore 
financial  markets  and  in  the  greater  foreign  participation  in  domestic 
financial  markets.  National financial credits,  loans and  deposits have  become 
more  sensitive  to  terms  and  conditions  set  in  international  markets. 
Moreover,  a  24-hour  global  market  in  securities  has  emerged  with  strong 
linkages between  major  financial centres. 
More  recently,  there  has  been  unprecedented  innovation  in  financial 
instruments,  services,  and  trading  techniques,  altering  the  structure  of 
intermediation  and  bringing  about  new  forms  of  competition  between  financial 
- 9  -institutions.  New,  more  flexible financial instruments have  appeared,  such  as 
negotiable  certificates  of  deposit,  morn-ey  market  mutual  funds,  various 
interest-bearing  checking  accounts,  bonds  with  variable  interest  rates  and 
inflation guarantees.  Securities markets have  grown  significantly  and  there 
has been  a  shift from  bank  credit towards negotiable instruments,  a  phenomenon 
referred  to  as  securitization  <see  Table  1 >.  Moreover,  the  traditional 
distinction between  commercial  banks  and  savings  institutions  has  tended  to 
break  down.  In  the  face  of  stiff  competition ·from  non-bank  financial 
institutions,  banks  have  been  forced  to circumvent regulations and  expand  the 
range  of  their  activities.  As  a  consequence,  the  asset  as  well  as  the 
liability side  of  different  financial  institutions  have  become  increasingly 
similar. 
TABLE  1 
International financial market  activity by  market  sectors 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
---------------------- ------------------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
International 
bond  issues  44.0  71.6  72.0  107.9  163.7 
Euro-note1 
facilities  1 . 0  2.3  3.3  18.8  49.5 
Total securities 
markets  45.0  73.9  75.3  126.7  213.2 
Syndicated2 
96.53  99.44  51.84  36.64  21 . 14  bank  loans 
Covers all Euro-note facilities including underwritten facilities  <NIFs, 
RUFs  and  multi-component  facilities with a  note  issuance option>  and 
non-underwritten or uncommitted  facilities/Euro-commercial paper  <ECP> 
2 programmes. 
3 Excludes  existing loans newly  negotiated where,l·.only  .. spreads are changed. 
4 Excludes  $35  billion of us  takeover-related ~andbys. 
Includes the following amounts  of non-spontaneous bank  lending:  $11.2 
billion in 1982,  $13.7 billion in 1983,  $6.5 billion in 1984,  $2.3 billion 
in 1985  and  $8  billion in 1986. 
Source  :  Bank  of England 
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220.3 
69.5 
289.8 
37.84 These  quantitative  and  qualitative  changes  have  been  the  result  of  the 
interaction of a  wide  range  of factors  : 
The  breakdown  of the  Bretton Woods  system  and  the  introduction of flexible 
exchange  rates  in 1973,  have  led  to  an  increase  in  interest  and  exchange 
rate variability.  The  resulting rise  in uncertainty  and  risk  created the 
need  to shift quickly and  cheaply between  financial  instruments,  stimulated 
the  development  of  new  techniques  for  risk-management,  such  as  futures, 
options,  interest rate and  currency swaps,  and  consequently  increased the 
economic  significance of the financial sector. 
After  the  economic  shocks  of  the  1  970s, 
substantial  amounts  of  foreign  funds  to 
deficits.  This  development  stimulated 
many  countries  had  to  raise 
finance  balance  of  payments 
the  growth  of  international 
financial  markets.  The  present  large  international  trade  and  current 
account  imbalances  between  major  industrial  countries  have  similar 
consequences.  Moreover,  rising  government  deficits  <especially  the 
sizeable  US  budget  deficit>  have  led  to  an  increase  in  the  volume  of 
government  bonds  issued,  and  contributed  to  a  deepening  of  existing bond 
and  other money  markets2 • 
The  growth  of  multinational  business  in  general  has  helped  to  promote  the 
diversity and  volume  of  international financial transactions. 
The  development  of offshore  financial markets  induced  national  authorities 
to liberalise regulations governing financial activities,  in order to avoid 
adverse  competitive  effects on  domestic  financial  institutions by  limiting 
excessively their international operations.  Deregulation was  also prompted 
by  the  expected domestic  benefits from  the development  of a  more  efficient 
financial  services  industry.  This  liberal,  market-oriented  approach has 
encouraged  the growth  of international financial  operations. 
Finally,  the  advance  in  information  and  communications  technology  has 
reduced  the  cost  and  increased  the  speed  and  efficiency  of  financial 
transactions,  thus  creating  an  incentive  for  financial  institutions  to 
furnish  a  wider  and  more  competitive  range  of  instruments.  It  has  also 
made  possible the development  and  expansion of global markets. 
- ,  ,  -The  aforementioned  significant changes  in  international  financial  operations, 
that  is  in  operations  covered  by  exchange  controls,  have  important 
implications for  the economies  of  the  Member  States of  the  Community  and  for 
the  attitude  of  their  authorities  towards  the  liberalisation  of  capital 
movements. 
The  growing  interdependence  of  national financial  markets  and  the  flexibility 
of  new  financial  instruments  have  increased  the  interest  and  exchange  rate 
sensitivity of capital flows  and  therefore have  imposed  additional constraints 
on  the  policy  options  of  monetary  authorities.  Given  the  increasing  size, 
number  and  sophistication  of  international  financial  operations  in  recent 
years,  "it  has  become  increasingly difficult  to isolate  domestic  financial 
markets,  especially the most  developed  ones,  from  external events.  The  period 
of time  in which  it  is possible  to take  advantage  of  the supposed  benefits of 
controls  smoothing  and  delaying  the  internal ... _:.:adjustments  to  outside 
pressures  - may  be  shortened  as  a  consequence,  while  the  operational  costs 
involved  in  stemming  given  financial  flows  may  increase."3  Moreover, 
exchange  controls have  -considerable negative effects on  the competitiveness of 
national financial  institutions and  can  produce  unfortunate distortions in the 
national financial  systems.  Those  Member  States which  want  to play an  active 
role  in  the  rapidly  expanding  international  financial  market  have  no  choice 
but  to  participate  in  the  process  of  internationalization,  deregulation  and 
modernization.  Many  countries  have  realized  this ·and  have  made  efforts to 
liberalise their financial markets. 
It  is  clearly  in  the -economic  interest  of  all Member  States that  this  move 
towards  financial  liberalisation acquires  a  European  dimension.  This  would 
render  European  capital  markets  much  more  attractive  and  would  increase their 
capacity of  providing risk  capital and  of financing  short-term investments  in 
the  new  financial  world  of  advanced  technology.  Moreover,  it  would  give 
Europe  a  greater  say  on  issues  concerning  the  operation  of  the  international 
financial  and  monetary  system.  But  for  this to  happen,  European  financial 
integration needs  to go  beyond  the  simple accrued  participation of  EEC  Member 
States  and  their  financial  institutions  in  the  process  of  globalization  of 
capital markets.  The  liberalisation of capital movements,  which  is a  form  of 
'negative integration',  should be  accompanied  by  positive measures  which  would 
- , 2  -strengthen  the  financial  and  monetary  identity  of  the  Community.  The 
necessity and  desirability of such  positive measures  will become  obvious  later 
in our analysis. 
- , 3  -2  Measures  for the free movement  of capital in the Community 
Progress  in  the  field  of  the  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  has  been 
particularly  slow.  This  is  in great  contrast  with  the  results  obtained  in 
other fields  of  the  Community  and  with  the  growing  significance  of  financial 
operations  in  the  world  economy.  An  assessment  of the  progress made  so far 
and  of the factors that have  tended  to retard the liberalisation and  financial 
integration will follow.  Beforehand,  however,  it would  be  useful to define a 
number  of  basic  concepts  that  are  central  to  the  analysis  of  the  process  of 
capital movement  liberalisation. 
2.1  Basic concepts 
By  movement  of  capital  we  generally  mean:  the  settlement  or  transfer  of 
tangible or  intangible assets  by  residents  of a  Member  State  in the territory 
of another Member  State;  and  the financial  operations which  result  in a  change 
in the  level or  composition of  debt  between  two  parties that are residents of 
different Member  States4.  The  sum  of  these transactions  make  up  the capital 
account  of  a  country's  balance of  payments.  Capital movements  can  be  either 
short-term  or  long-term.  However,  the  distinction  between  the  two  is not 
always  clear.  In  general,  short-term  capital  movements  primarily  reflect 
international  differences  in  interest  rates  and  speculators'  expectations 
about  exchange  rate  changes.  Capital  tends  to  leave  countries  with  low 
interest rates and/or weak  currencies  in danger  of devaluation.  In contrast, 
long-term capital  movements  are  much  less  speculative,  reflecting government 
or private  investment  in other countries guided  by  long-term considerations. 
For the purpose  of our analysis,  we  can distinguish three different categories 
of  financial  operations  which  also  correspond  to  three  different  degrees  in 
the liberalisation of capital movements5: 
a>  Capital Operations.  These  operations are directly linked to the effective 
exercise of the other fundamental  freedoms  of the common  market,  i.e.  the 
freedom  of  establishment,  the  freedom  of  trade  in  goods  and  services and 
the  free  movement  of  persons.  They  include  import  and  export  credits, 
direct  investments and  various personal capital movements. 
- 14  -b>  Operations  in  financial  market  securities.  This  category  includes  the 
acquisition by  investors and  the  issue and  placing by  enterprises of bonds, 
shares  and  other  securities  of  a  participating  nature  on  the  capital 
market.  The  liberalisation  of  these  operations  places  Member  States' 
financial  markets  in  direct  competition  and  therefore  can  give  rise  to 
significant  capital  flows.  Its  impact  on  the  balance  of  payments  is 
usually  greater  immediately  after  the  removal  of  exchange  restrictions, 
because financial operators are suddenly offered the right - which  they did 
not  have  before  - to  restructure  their  portfolios  by  purchasing  foreign 
securities.  In  the  long-term,  the  volatility of  such  capital  flows  is 
expected  to  be  much  more  limited.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that 
financial  innovation  tends  to  increase  the  liquidity  and  mobility  of  this 
type of placement. 
The  liberalisation of operations  in securities  is a  necessary  precondition 
for  the  interconnection  of  Member  States'  financial  markets  and  for  the 
creation of a  single European  market  in securities. 
c>  Operations  involving  financial  credits  and  operations  relating  to  money 
market  instruments.  These  operations include the opening of and  placing of 
funds  on  current  or  deposit  accounts,  the  granting  and  repayment  of 
short-term  credits  and  short-term  investments  in  treasury bills  and  other 
securities  dealt  in  on  the  money  market.  Their  liberalisation  has  an 
impact  on  the  organization  and  . functioning  of  national  banking  and 
financial  systems.  It  also  affects  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  by 
making  ineffective  certain  national  anti-inflationary  measures,  such  as 
domestic credit  controls.  Monetary  authorities are forced  to rely  mainly 
on  interest  rate  management  and  open  market  operations.  Finally,  the 
liberalisation  of  these  operations,  which  are  extremely  sensitive  to 
expectations  about  exchange  rate  changes,  increases  the  risks  of 
speculation  against  the  national  currency  when  tensions  arise  in  foreign 
exchange  markets,  and  can  seriously  aggravate  balance  of  payments 
difficulties.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  experience  shows  that  the 
effectiveness of controls on  short-term monetary  operations is increasingly 
being eroded. 
- 15  -The  liberalisation  of  short-term  monetary  operations  is  a  necessary 
precondition  for  the  establishment  of  a  unified  financial  system  in  the 
Community. 
2.2  The  Treaty of Rome  and  the Directives of 1960  and  1962 
The  Treaty  establishing the  European  Economic  Community  sets the objective  of 
the  free  movement  of  capital  between  Member  States,  but  limits its scope  by 
providing  that  the  removal  of  restrictions  to  the  free  movement  of  capital 
must  take place  progressively and  only "to  the extent  necessary to  ensure the 
proper functioning of the common  market"  <Article 67>.  It imposes  no  calendar 
for the removal  of exchange  restrictions and  leaves to the Council  the task of 
issuing the necessary Directives for the progressive liberalisation of capital 
movements  <Article 69>. 
The  limited  ambition  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  regarding  the  liberalisation of 
capital movements,  can  be  partly explained by  the economic  situation in Europe 
at  the  time  of  the  establishment  of  the  EEC.  International  financial 
operations  were  much  more  limited  than  nowadays  and  most  Member  States  ha:i 
just re-established the external convertibility of their currencies.  National 
authorities  at  that  time  were  particularly  concerned  with  a  perceived 
insufficiency of domestic  investment  and  savings.  Moreover,  they were  anxious 
to preserve  their monetary  policy autonomy  and  recognized  that under  a  system 
of  free commercial  exchanges  and  fixed  exchange  rates,  the  liberalisation of 
capital movements  would  have  made  such  an  autonomy  impossible. 
The  cautious  approach to  the liberalisation  of capital  movements  was  probably 
also an  expression of political realism.  Agreement  between  Member  States,  even 
on  the  principles  of  the  liberalisation  of  commercial  exchanges,  had  been 
obtained  with  great  difficulty;  any  attempt  to  commit  them  to  a  parallel 
liberalisation of  capital  movements  might  have  destroyed  the  consensus  that 
had  been  attained. 
Due  to  the  above  situation,  the  implementation  of  article  67  was  limited to 
two  Directives  adopted  in  1960  and  19626.  These  Directives  liberalised  the 
first category of financial operations  <i.e.  the capital operations which  are 
directly linked to the effective exercise of the other fundamental  freedoms  of 
the  common  market>  as  well  as  the  acquisition  of  securities  dealt  in  on  the 
- 16  -stock  exchange  of  a  Member  State.  Liberalisation  of  these  operations  was 
unconditional and  could  only be  suspended  by  invoking the safeguard clauses of 
the Treaty.  The  liberalisation of other  forms  of  capital movements,  such as 
the  introduction  of  securities  of  a  national  enterprise  into  the  market  of 
another  Member  State,  operations  in  securities  not  dealt  in  on  the  stock 
exchange,  medium- and  long-term financial  credits,  was  conditional.  Member 
States  were  allowed  to  maintain  or  reintroduce  restrictions,  which  were 
operative  on  the  date  of  entry  into force  of the  Directive or  on  the  date of 
accession to the Community,  where  their elimination might  form  an  obstacle to 
the  achievement  of  national  economic  policy  objectives.  For  the  remaining 
financial  operations,  concerning monetary  transactions of a  short-term nature, 
Member  States were  free to impose  restrictions or not. 
2.3  The  1970s:  the reinforcement of exchange  controls 
Despite the  limited ambitions  of the  1960  and  1962  Directives,  Member  States 
did  not  comply  with  them  in  practice.  Developments  in  the  field  of  the 
liberalisation  of  capital  movements  during  the  1970s  were  particularly 
disappointing.  Exchange  controls were  reinforced7.  Most  Member  States invoked 
the  safeguard  clause  of  article  108  to  maintain  and  even  reintroduce 
restrictions on  capital movements  that were  supposed  to be  liberalised.  These 
derogations tended  to become  permanent.  By  the end  of the decade,  only the  FRG 
and  the Benelux  contries complied  with Community  obligations8. 
The  above  situation was  mainly  due  to: 
the  pronounced  instability  in  international  monetary  relations,  which 
prevailed after the breakdown  of the Bretton Woods  system,  and  the general 
deterioration  in  the  international  economic  environment.  The  effect  of 
global  inflation  and  recession  on  the  European  economies  proved  to  be 
decisive; 
the  existence  of  significant  divergences  in  Member  States'  economic 
performance  and  of great differences in their relative ability to adjust9; 
the  lack  of  political  consensus  at  the  Community  level  about  what  form 
adjustment  policies  should  take,  and  the  unwillingness  of  some  Member 
States  <like  the  UK,  France  and  Italy>  to  accept  constraints  on  their 
monetary  policy autonomy. 
- 17  -The  establishment  of  the European  Monetary  System  <EMS>  in  1979,  meant  that 
the Member  States which  participate in  the exchange  rate mechanism  <ERM>  have 
had  to  accept  additional  constraints  in  the  conduct  of  their monetary  policy 
in exchange  for the benefits deriving from  the creation of "a zone  of monetary 
stability in Europe".  But  four out of the eight Member  States participating in 
the ERM  <Denmark,  France,  Italy,  Ireland>  continued to use controls on  capital 
movements  as  an  instrument  to stabilize their exchange  rate.  The  UK,  on  the 
other  hand,  refused  to  participate  in  the  ERM  of  the  EMS,  but  decided  to 
remove  all barriers to capital movements. 
2.4  The  revival of interest in the liberalisation of capital movements 
The  secondary  role attributed  by  the  Treaty  of  Rome  to  the  liberalisation of 
capital  movements  could  not  last  for  long,  if  European  integration  was  to 
proceed  further.  The  revival  of  interest  in  the  economic  and  monetary 
integration of  the Community  gave  a  new  impetus  to discussions  concerning the 
liberalisation of  capital movements  between  the  Member  States.  The  start was 
made  in  1983  by  a  communication  of  the  Commission  to  the  Council  for  the 
creation of  an  integrated  financial  area  in  the  Community10.  Then,  in  May 
1986,  the  Commission  proposed  a  comprehensive  programme  for  the  full 
liberalisation of capital movements  in two  phases11 . 
A.  The  first phase: 
The  objective of the first phase  is to achieve the unconditional and  effective 
liberalisation  throughout  the  Community  of  capital  operations  most  directly 
necessary for  the proper  functioning of  the common  market  and  for the  linkage 
of national financial securities'  markets. 
For the attainment  of this objective,  a  Directive was  adopted  by  the Council 
in November  1986  which  extended  the obligation of unconditional  liberalisation 
to the  following  financial  operations12:  long-term  commercial  credits;  the 
acquisition of  financial market  securities,  whether  or not  they are  dealt  in 
on  a  stock exchange;  and  the admission of securities <shares and  bonds>  of an 
enterprise  of  a  Member  State  to  the  capital  market  of  another  Member  State, 
under condition that these  securities are  dealt  in  on,  or  are  in  the process 
of  introduction to,  a  stock exchange  in a  Member  State. 
- 18  -In order  to reinforce  these new  regulations,  the  Commission  has  also engaged 
in a  much  more  rigorous  management  of  the derogations  accorded  to  some  Member 
States  <see  Section 2.5 below>. 
B.  The  second  phase: 
In the second  phase,  decisive steps will have  to be  taken towards the creation 
of  a  European  financial  market  without  frontiers  by  abolishing  all 
restricitons  to  capital  movements.  For  this  purpose,  the  Commission  has 
already made  specific proposals to the Council  for13: 
a>  A  Directive  based  on  article  67  of  the  Treaty,  aiming  at  extending 
liberalisation to all capital  movements.  This  extention will  mainly  cover 
the following operations:  investments in short-term securities dealt  in on 
the  money  market,  current  and  deposit  account  operations,  and  financial 
loans  and  credits.  Moreover,  Member  States  will  be  able  to  maintain  or 
introduce a  dual  exchange  market  only under  a  safeguard clause. 
The  new  Directive will  also contain  a  specific  safeguard clause  which  will 
permit  the reintroduction of controls on  short-term capital movements  for a 
limited  period  of  time,  if these  movements  are  seriously  endangering  the 
monetary  or exchange  rate stability of a  Member  State.  It should be  noted, 
however,  that the effectiveness of this safeguard clause may  be  low,  since 
the  achievement  of  financial  integration  in  the  Community  will  further 
reduce  the  already  limited  effectiveness of  controls on  short-term  capital 
movements.  The  only  lasting  way  to  limit  destabilizing  capital  flows 
between  Member  States  is  through  long-term  measures  to  increase  the 
financial  stability  of  the  Community  and  to  reinforce  the  EMS  <see  also 
Section  4.3>.  The  safeguard  clause  can  only  be  a  short-term  emergency 
measure. 
b>  The  amendment  of  the  1972  Directive  on  regulating  international  capital 
flows14,  so as to: 
- include a  declaration of intent by  Member  States that they will endeavour 
to  attain  a  degree  of  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  to  and  from 
third countries equivalent to that within the Community; 
- give a  Community  dimension  in measures  taken vis-a-vis third countries; 
- 19  -- provide  for  the  symmetrical  use  of  regulatory  instruments  <which  now 
cover  mainly  inflows  of  capital>.  This  will  enable  the  Community  to 
protect  itself  from  short-term  capital  movements  of  great  magnitude  to 
and  from  third countries,  which  could  lead to serious disturbances in the 
monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies  of  the  Member  States  and  could 
threaten the stability of the EMS. 
However,  doubts  have  been  expressed about  whether the  amendments  proposed 
by  the Commission  will be  sufficient to protect the Community  from  monetary 
disturbances originating abroad. 
c>  A  Regulation  combining  the  existing  Community  loan  and  medium-term 
financial assistance mechanisms  into a  single financial support  instrument, 
and  extending  the  conditions  under  which  medium-term  assistance  can  be 
granted,  to  cover  needs  associated  with  the  liberalisation  of  capital 
movements.  This  extension  is  mainly  aiming  at  dissuading  destabilizing 
speculation  and  at  increasing  the  ability of  the  authorities to  cope  with 
it. 
The  implications of the second  phase  will be  considerable.  From  a  quantitative 
point of view,  the amount  of short-term capital in international markets is at 
least equal  to that of medium- and  long-term capital.  From  a  qualitative point 
of  view,  the  liberalisation  of  short-term  monetary  operations  will  open  the 
way  for  intensified speculation against national currencies under  pressure and 
will completely deprive national authorities of their already  limited monetary 
policy autonomy. 
2.5  Exchange  controls in the Member  States 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  give  a  general  idea  of  the  present  state  of 
exchange  controls  in the  different EEC  Member  States15•  This will  suffice to 
show  that  great  differences  exist  between  them  in  the  degree  of  capital 
movement  liberalisation already  implemented  and  that  substantial  progress  is 
still needed  in order to establish a  truly integrated European  financial  area, 
comprising all twelve  Member  States. 
Several  Member  States  have  liberalised  capital  movements  beyond  their 
Community  obligations. 
- 20  -In  the  FRG  the  law  <Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz>  authorizes  the  imposition  of 
restrictions  on  capital  movements  in  certain cases,  especially restrictions 
concerning capital  imports.  At  present,  however,  no  restrictions exist in this 
country  either for  residents  or  for  non-residents  and  capital  movements  are 
virtually free. 
In  Belgium  and  Luxembourg,  capital  movements  are  liberalised.  The  only 
exception  is the  existence  of  a  dual  exchange  market,  which  is  regarded  by 
many  as a  major  imperfection. 
In the  UK,  all restrictions to  capital movements  to and  from  third countries 
were  abolished  in October  1979. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  important  steps  towards  liberalisation of 
capital  movements  have  also  been  taken  by  Member  States  which  previously 
applied strict exchange  controls. 
In the Netherlands,  a  new  law  was  introduced  in 1980,  making  capital movements 
to  and  from  third  countries  free  and  abolishing  the  requirement  for  prior 
authorization.  However,  like in  the FRG,  the law  permits the  imposition of 
restrict  ions  on  capital  movements  in  certain  periods.  Unt i 1  July  1983,  a 
number  of capital imports were  subjected to such restrictions.  But  since then 
capital movements  have  been  completely  liberalised.  Only  the  issue of foreign 
securities  in  the  Netherlands  requires  prior  authorization  of  the  central 
bank16. 
Denmark  was  initially authorized  to retain restrictions on  capital  movements 
liberalised at  the  Community  level.  However,  during  the  first half  of  the 
1980s it proceeded  to a  rapid abolition of the restrictions.  In May  1983,  the 
Danish  authorities  liberalised  completely  the  purchase  by  residents  of 
exchange-listed  bonds  and  lifted  the  ban  on  the  sale  abroad  of  Danish 
government  bonds.  Then  in  January  1984,  residents  gained  access  to  the 
purchase  of  exchange-listed  shares.  These  measures  allowed  Denmark  to 
terminate  its  derogation  in  December  1984.  In  June  1985,  Denmark  adopted 
additional  liberalising measures  in the field of financial  loans17 . 
- 21  -In France,  severe restrictions  on  capital  movements  have  been  applied  in the 
past  under  the  safeguard  clause  of  the  Treaty.  However,  in  May  1986,  the 
French  authorities  announced  that  they  would  no  longer  invoke  the  derogation 
and  adopted  important  measures  for  the  relaxation  of  exchange  controls.  For 
instance,  direct  investments abroad  were  liberalised,  exporters and  importers 
were  permitted  to buy  foreign currencies  in advance  for hedging,  ceilings in 
bank  transfers of individuals  to non-residents  were  abolished.  Nevertheless, 
important  restrictions  still  exist  in  the  field  of  short-term  capital 
movements18• 
In Italy,  while  capital  transactions  by  non-residents  have  been  relatively 
free,  exports  of  capital  by  residents  have  been  subjected  to  severe 
restrictions.  In  1974,  Italy  was  authorized  to  invoke  article  108  of  the 
Treaty.  Italian residents who  purchased real estate abroad  or acquired  foreign 
securities,  were  required to make  a  non-interest-bearing bank  deposit equal  to 
40~ of the value of the acquired  foreign assets.  For securities issued by  EEC 
institutions the  deposit obligation  was  30~,  and  for  securities retained  for 
less than one  year 50%.  Collective  investment  undertakings were  exempted  from 
the deposit  requirement  up  to  an  amount  equivalent  to  10%  of  the  value  of 
their portfolios.  During  recent years,  steps were  taken to limit the deposit 
obligation.  Finally,  in  May  1987  the  Italian  authorities  announced  the 
termination of the protective clauses from  which  Italy previously benefited19• 
However,  the move  towards relaxation of exchange  controls proved  to be  rather 
limited and  uncertain.  In mid-September  1987,  as part of a  policy tightening 
to protect the lira, the Italian authorities reintroduced a  number  of controls 
h  1  .  f  .  20  on  t  e  externa  transact1ons o  enterpr1ses  . 
In the remaining EEC  Member  States,  which  possess the least advanced  economies 
within the Community  and  relatively undeveloped  capital markets,  many  exchange 
controls  are  still  in  force.  For  these  Member  States  the  road  towards  the 
liberalisation  of  capital  movements  is  full  of  obstacles  and  risks  <see 
Section 4.4 below>. 
In  Ireland,  the  central  bank  practices  a  rigorous  control  on  capital 
movements.  For  example,  residents  are  not  free  to  buy  foreign  securities  -
except  when  these  are  issued  by  Community  institutions;  loans  in  favour  of 
non-residents  are  normally  not  permitted;  direct  investments  are  subject  to 
prior  authorization21  •  A  Commission  decision,  as  amended  and  renewed  in 
- 22  -December  1987,  authorizes Ireland to maintain restrictions on  the acquisition 
by  residents of foreign securities dealt  in on  a  stock exchange22. 
In Greece,  inward  capital movements  <e.g.  for direct investment  or for making 
deposits in  foreign exchange>  have  been  free and  have  been  encouraged  through 
various  forms  of  incentives,  while  outward  capital  movements  have  been 
subjected  to  strict restrictions.  The  Accession  Treaty  authorized  Greece  to 
defer until  the  end  of  1985  the  liberalisation  of  certain  capital  movements 
that  had  already  been  liberalised  at  the  Community  level.  In  view  of  the 
difficulties facing the Greek  economy,  a  Commission  decision in November  1985, 
as  amended  in  February  1987,  authorized  Greece  to maintain  the restrictions 
until the end  of 198823 . 
Nevertheless,  during  1986  and  1987  important  steps  were  made  towards 
liberalising a  large number  of outward  capital movements  by  non-residents. 
Foreigners who  are not  residents  of  the  EEC  and  have  made  direct  investments 
in Greece,  are now  permitted to  repatriate the  related interest  and  dividend 
income,  and  also,  after a  three-year period,  the  imported  capital and  capital 
gains.  Capital  exports by  foreigners related  to investment  in real  estate in 
Greece  are normally not permitted,  while capital exports related to investment 
in Greek  securities are free. 
Capital  movements  between  Greece  and  the  other  EEC  Member  States  are  now 
covered  by  the  provisions  of  Presidential  Decree  207/87. 
regulatory framework  can be  described as follows. 
The  existing 
The  repatriation  of  the  capital  imported  to  Greece  by  EEC  residents  for  the 
purpose  of  direct  investment,  as  well  as  of  profits,  dividends  and  capital 
gains  is  free.  Personal  capital  movements  and  capital  exports  related  to 
investment  in real estate by  EEC  residents are also free.  Approval  of capital 
exports  of  the  above  categories  is  no  longer  based  on  the  criterion  of 
"economic  need".  Only  the  authenticity of  the transactions  is examined.  For 
Greek  residents  liberalisation  of  the  above  capital  movements  has  been 
postponed  unt  i 1  22  November  1  988.  Unt i 1  then  they  are  subject  to  prior 
approval. 
- 23  -The  repatriation  of  the  proceeds  from  the  liquidation  of  Greek  securities 
purchased  by  EEC  residents is also free.  The  same  holds true for  investment  in 
treasury bills and  government  bonds.  Greek  residents are not allowed  to invest 
in  foreign  securities,  except  where  they  have  legally  obtained  foreign 
exchange.  The  liberalisation  of  these  financial  operations  has  also  been 
postponed  until  22  November  1988.  However,  investment  funds  are  allowed  to 
invest  20'- of their capital  in  foregn securities.  Moreover,  Greek  residents 
are free to acquire securities issued by  EEC  institutions and  by  the EIB. 
For  the rest  of  capital  movements  strict restrictions and  controls  are still 
applied and  prior authorization is required. 
In Spain and  Portugal,  controls are applied on  both  inward  and  outward  capital 
movements.  In Portugal  all private capital transactions  are subject  to prior 
authorization by  the Bank  of Portugal.  In Spain,  however,  restrictions are 
less strict and  during  recent  years  there  has  been  a  move  towards relaxation 
of a  number  of  controls.  For  instance,  in  May  1985,  regulations  governing 
foreign direct and  portfolio investments were  substantially liberalised24• 
Spain and  Portugal are authorized by  the Accession Treaty to maintain a  number 
of restrictions  on  capital  flows25.  Spain  may  continue  to apply  restrictions 
on: 
- the acquisition of foreign securities by  residents and  direct  investments by 
residents in foreign unit trusts until 31  December  1988; 
real  estate investments  by  residents  and  direct  investments by  residents in 
foreign  undertakings  having  as  their  object  immovable  property  until  31 
December  1990. 
Portugal may  continue to apply restrictions on: 
- direct  investments by  non-residents until 31  December  1989; 
- the  purchase  of  immovable  property  and  the  transfer  of  proceeds  of 
liquidation  of  real  estate  investments  by  non-residents,  personal  capital 
movements  and  the  acquisition of  foreign securities by  residents,  until 31 
December  1990; 
- direct  investments abroad  by  residents until 31  December  1992. 
- 24  -3  Arguments  for the liberalisation of capital movements 
The  arguments  usually  put  forward  in  favour  of  the  liberalisation  of  capital 
movements  throughout  the  Community  are  mainly  based  on  the  following 
considerations26: 
A.  The  completion of the internal market 
The  White  Paper and  the Single Act  set the objective of completing by  1992  the 
internal market,  in which  goods,  services  <including financial services>,  and 
persons will  be  able  to circulate  freely27.  The  attainment of  this objective 
is  highly  desirable  for  both  economic  <economies  of  scale,  more  efficient 
resource allocation,  stimulation of  investment,  etc.>  and  political reasons, 
and  is expected to strenghten integration.  The  realization of a  large  internal  - market  without  frontiers will not be  possible without  the prior liberalisation 
of  capital  movements.  More  specifically,  the  free  movement  of  capital  is a 
necessary precondition for: 
- the  unimpeded  conduct  of  commercial  exchanges,  and  therefore  the  further 
expansion  of  intra-EEC  trade; 
- the  effective  exercise  of  the  freedom  of  establishment.  For  instance, 
restrictions  on  direct  investment  constitute  an  obstacle  to  the 
establishment of national enterprises abroad; 
- the  free  supply  of  financial  services  and  the  creation  of  an  integrated 
European  financial  market.  Indeed,  it  would  be  pointless  to  harmonize 
national  regulations  concerning  financial  activities and  to  give  financial 
institutions the right to supply their services in other Member  States,  if -
because  of  the  existence  of  capital  movement  controls  - residents  in  one 
Member  State  were  not  allowed  to  execute  financial  operations  in  another 
Member  State; 
the  establishment of  a  healthy  economic  environment,  in which  all European 
enterprises  wi 11  have  access  to  the  most  advanced  and  efficient  ways  of 
financing and  will compete  on  a  fair basis; 
the  creation  of  the  Europe  of  citizens,  in which  European  nationals will 
circulate  freely,  will  be  given  the  right  to  open  an  account  in  foreign 
currency and  to use  eurocheques  and  other payment  instruments,  and  will be 
able  to conclude  transactions with  residents of  other Member  States without 
being subjected to complex  controls and  formalities. 
- 25  -B.  The  reinforcement of the  EMS  and  the creation of a  monetary  union 
There  is a  strong link between  the liberalisation of capital movements  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  EMS.  On  the  one  hand,  the  exchange  rate stability and 
monetary  policy  convergence  already  achieved,  largely  due  to  the  successful 
operation of the EMS,  make  easier the gradual removal  of barriers to the free 
movement  of  capital.  On  the  other  hand,  the  liberalisation  of  capital 
movements  will require a  reinforcement of  the EMS  in terms  of closer  and  more 
disciplined  coordination  of  monetary  and  economic  policies  of  EEC  Member 
States
28
•  Closer  coordination  will  increase  the  dynamism  of  Member  States' 
economic  policies  and  will  have  a  favourable  impact  on  confidence  and 
investment  throughout  the  Community.  Furthermore,  it will  contribute  to  an 
expansion  of  the  use  of  the  Ecu  both  inside  and  outside  the  Community,  and 
will  constitute  a  step  forward  towards  the  creation  of  a  European  monetary 
union.  Consequently,•  Europe  will  be  better equipped  to  protect  itself from 
external economic  disturbances and  will become  able to play a  more  active role 
in the management  of international monetary  relations. 
C.  The  improvement  of  the  international  competitiveness  of  European  capital 
markets  and  the creation of an  integrated European  financial area 
The  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  will  create  pressure  on  European 
financial  institutions  to  increase  their  efficiency,  and  therefore  will 
improve  their ability to face  up  to the competition from  their counterparts in 
the  US  and  Japan.  Restrictions  on  capital  movements  can  seriously  harm  the 
competitiveness  of  European  financial  markets,  at  a  time  when  the  financial 
sector is acquiring an  increasing importance  in the world  economy  <see  Chapter 
1 >.  Furthermore,  the  liberalisation,  if  combined  with  appropriate 
harmonization  measures,  will  lay  the  foundations  of  a  totally  integrated 
financial area.  A European  financial  identity will thus be  created. 
D.  The  stimulation of economic  activity in the Community 
The  liberalisation of capital movements  and  the creation of a  unified European 
financial  market  will  expose  national  financial  institutions to  a  much  more 
competitive environment.  Stiffer competition will tend to  lower  the costs and 
increase  the  efficiency  of  intermediation.  The  development  of  new,  more 
efficient  ways  of  placement  and  financing  will  improve  the  allocation  of 
- 26  -resources,  will  inject  new  economic  dynamism  to  Community  enterprises,  and 
will  stimulate  savings  and  investment,  thus  contributing to  the  creation  of 
employment.  In  particular,  small- and  medium-sized  enterprises,  which 
currently have  no  access to the international capital market,  will be  able to 
benefit from  more  flexible terms of credit,  loans  in foreign currencies and  a 
better  financing  of  their  own  funds,  and  therefore  will  be  encouraged  to 
expand  their  activities.  As  investment  opportunities  inside  the  Community 
become  more  attractive  and  more  easily  exploited,  it  is possible  that  the 
amount  of capital  leaving the EEC  for the US  will be  reduced. 
In conclusion,  according to the above  arguments,  the liberalisation of capital 
movements  can  create  considerable  opportunities  for  the  future  growth  of  the 
economies  of the EEC  Member  States.  However,  the liberalisation process is not 
free of obstacles and  risks.  First of all,  there is the general danger  of an 
overexpansion  of  the  financial  sector  and  of  financial  activity  to  the 
detriment  of productive  investment  and  of real economic  activity.  This danger 
should  be  understood  and  avoided,  mainly  through  intergovernmental  monetary 
and  economic  cooperation  to  create  a  climate  of  stability  favourable  to 
productive  investment.  Otherwise,  the  aforementioned  growth  and  employment 
benefits of  creating  an  integrated  financial  area  will  not  be  realized.  But 
other more  specific obstacles and  risks exist as well.  An  analysis of the most 
important  among  them  will follow
29
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- 27  -4  Difficulties and  risks in the liberalisation of capital moVements 
4.1  Obstacles in the field of financial services 
The  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  may  not  be  sufficient  to  ensure  the 
attainment  of  the  major  objective  of  creating  a  stable  integrated  European 
financial area,  if it is not  accompanied  by  additional measures  of  'positive 
integration'.  As  the  recent  stock  market  crisis  of  October  1987  has  made 
obvious,  uncontrolled  dereguration  entails  risks  for  the  stability  of  the 
financial  system30 .  Furthermore,  differing prudential regulations and  controls 
of a  technical nature  as well  as dissimilar  legal and  administrative systems, 
can  continue  to  create artificial barriers to  the  conslusion  of  transactions 
between  residents  of  different  Member  States  and  to  the  free  supply  of 
financial services throughout  the Community.  As  a result,  the European  capital 
market  may  remain  fragmented. 
If the above  risks are to be  avoided,  parallel progress must  be  made  towards  a 
common  market  in  financial  services.  The  Commission's  method  of  approach  in 
this  matter  is  based  on  a  number  of  innovative  principles,  which  - if 
implemented  - will  have  considerable  impact  on  the  evolution  of  financial 
systems  in Europe.  It comprises three main  elements: 
a>  the mutual  recognition of financial techniques  in different Member  States; 
b>  the  harmonization  of  the  essential  elements  of  rules  and  standards 
concerning  the  protection  of  users  of  financial  services  and  the 
supervision of suppliers.  Such  a  harmonization is necessary,  since mutual 
recognition  is  only  feasible  if there  is sufficient  institutional  common 
ground; 
c>  the principle of  'home  country control',  according to which  all activities 
of  financial  institutions throughout  the  Community  will  be  supervised  by 
the  authorities  in  the  country  of  origin.  This  principle  actually means 
that each  Member  State will have  to recognize on  its territory the validity 
of  regulations  which  are  in  force  in  other  Member  States  and  to trust the 
surveillance of foreign financial  institutions to the competing authorities 
of the country of origin. 
Progress  in  the  field  of  financial  services  has  been  particularly  slow. 
Nevertheless,  a  number  of Directives have  been  adopted  since the beginning of 
the 1970s,  which  have  laid the foundations of a  coordinated system.  Moreover, 
- 28  -in recent  years  there  has  been  a  revival  of  interest.  For  example,  in  the 
field  of  banking  services  the  Commission  has  undertaken  serious  efforts  to 
ensure  the  freedom  of  establishment  and  the  coordination  of  regulatory 
systems.  This  was  made  necessary  in  view  of  the  fact  that  - despite  the 
adopted  Directives  - there  is  still  not  complete  freedom  for  banks  to 
establish in other Member  States,  and  in some  Member  States foreign banks  are 
still required to have  their own  endowment  capital.  The  proposals put forward 
by  the  Commission  concern:  the  reorganization  and  winding  up  of  credit 
institutions;  the  harmonization  of the  concept  of  own  funds  for  supervisory 
purposes;  the approximation of solvency ratios;  the establishment of deposit 
protection schemes;  the control of large exposures of credit institutions;  and 
the elimination of remaining barriers to the free provision of mortsase credit 
throughout  the Community. 
Special  mention  should  be  made  to  the  proposal,  recently  presented  by  the 
Commission,  for  a  Second  Banking  Directive,  according  to  which  all credit 
institutions duly authorized  in the home  country,  will be  able to establish or 
supply services throughout  the Community  without  further authorization31 .  The 
implementation  of  this  Directive  is  likely  to  hasten  the  process  of 
deregulation already evident  in many  Member  States.  The  Directive will allow a 
universal  bank  to  offer  all its services  in  countries  where  there  may  be  a 
distinction  between  investment  and  commercial  banking,  thus  leading  to  an 
erosion  of  such  distinctions.  Countries  will  be  obliged  to  admit  competing 
financial  techniques  used  in  other  Member  States,  even  if  their  own 
institutions are currently prohibited from  offering them.  Competition between 
national regulatory systems will  be  encouraged  and  this  may  lead  to alignment 
at the level of the most  liberal. · Moreover,  new  financial  instruments will be 
introduced and  there will be  pressure on  domestic  banks  to provide them  and  on 
governments  to allow their use32. 
From  the above  it becomes  obvious that the principle of mutual  recosnition has 
far-reaching  implications  for  the  operation  of  national  financial  systems. 
Therefore,  the  necessary  action  in  the  field  of  financial  services  will 
inevitably  face  serious  obstacles  due  to  existing  differences  in  the 
characteristics of  national financial  markets  and  in the  levels of  protection 
deemed  necessary by  different Member  States.  The  ultimate question is whether 
the political commitment  required to overcome  these obstacles will exist. 
- 29  -4.2 Fiscal  issues 
In a  Community  where  capital movements  will be  completely free,  interest rates 
will tend to converge  towards  a  common  level.  Therefore,  investment decisions, 
concerning direct investments by  companies  as well as portfolio investments by 
individual  investors,  will  be  significantly  influenced  by  differences  in 
taxation  between  Member  States.  The  result  may  be  a  highly  undesirable 
misallocation of resources within the Community.  In addition,  the existence of 
tax incentives for the purchase  of domestic securities,  recently introduced by 
several  Member  States,  may  also  lead  to  a  misallocation  of capital  funds  in 
the field of portfolio investment. 
In order to avoid  such developments,  there should be  a  closer approximation of 
the tax systems,  the taxable base and  tax rates in the different Member  States 
and  an  elimination of all relevant distortions. 
Moreover,  there  is a  risk  that  the  full  liberalisation of  capital  movements 
may  lead  to  an  increase  in  tax  evasion.  Investors  holding  bank  accounts  in 
other  Member  States  may  be  tempted  not  to  declare  the  interest  income  paid 
into these  accounts.  This  practice could  result in  a  reduction  in government 
tax revenues  and  impair fiscal equity. 
The  Commission  is at  the moment  considering various  solutions for  the purpose 
of minimizing  the risks of tax evasion,  such  as an  obligation on  all banks  to 
declare interest income,  or a  generalized witholding tax on  interest payments. 
No  simple  and  straightforward  solution  to  this  problem  exists.  On  the 
contrary,  various complexities are  involved.  On  the one  hand,  the obligatory 
reporting  of  interest  income  by  banks  would  be  complex  and  would  involve 
serious administrative costs.  On  the other hand,  an  EEC·  ~ide withholding tax 
would  face  two  main  hurdles:  firstly,  it would  be  r·  ~ticularly difficult to 
reach agreement  on  an  acceptable rate,  and  seconr.y,  even  if agreement  on  a 
common  rate  was  reached,  Member  States would  · .sk driving  capital  away  from 
the  Community  to  third  countries  with  lower  tax  burdens.  It follows  that  a 
fully  effective  solution  could  only  bf'  dChieved  through  agreement  at  the 
international  level.  However,  it  is  well-known  that  the  attainment  of 
international agreement  on  such  thorny  issues is particularly difficult. 
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The  full  liberalisation of  capital  movements  will  have  serious  implications 
for  Member  States'  monetary  policies.  The  Member  States which  have  already 
abolished all restrictions on  capital movements  will have  to learn  to live in 
a  much  more  volatile  and  uncertain  monetary  environment.  The  increase  in 
short-term  monetary  transactions  by  both  residents  and  non-residents  will 
render  their  monetary  aggregates  more  sensitive  and  less  easily controlled. 
However,  it is the Member  States which  still apply  exchange  controls that are 
going to face  the greatest challenge.  Speculation against their currencies in 
periods  of  economic  difficulties  will  be  intensified.  Capital  flows  will 
respond  quickly  to  interest  and  inflation  rate  differentials  and  to 
expectations  about  exchange  rate  changes.  Monetary  authorities will  have  to 
resort  increasingly  to  interest  rate  management  through  open  market 
operations,  while  quantitative  controls  on  domestic  credit  will  become 
completely  ineffective.  Interest  rates  will  actually  be  subordinated  to 
maintaining  the  stability of  the  exchange  rate,  which  signifies a  virtually 
complete  loss of monetary  policy autonomy
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It  follows  that  without  controls  on  capital  movements,  the  adoption  of 
uncoordinated  monetary  policy  measures  can  cause  great  losses  of  foreign 
exchange  reserves in order to maintain parity within fluctuation margins.  Only 
a  strengthened  EMS  can  reconcile  the  objective  of  a  single  financial  market 
with  exchange  rate stability.  Progress to  be  achieved  in this direction does 
not  necessarily  entail  immediate  monetary  union  but  rather  a  more  organic 
monetary  and  economic  cooperation  among  Member  States  as  well  as  a  more 
efficient  and  flexible  method  of  short-term  exchange  rate  management  during 
- d  f  - 34  per1o  s  o  tens1on  . 
As  far  as  the  latter  is  concerned,  an  important  development  has  been  the 
adoption of a  package  on  the strengthening of the  EMS  by  the Finance Ministers 
at  an  informal  Council  meeting  held  at  Nyborg  on  12  September  1987.  It was 
agreed  that  central  banks  would  attempt  to  achieve  a  more  flexible  use  of 
intra-marginal  intervention  to  maintain  exchange  rate  pari  ties  <i.e.  of 
intervention that  is conducted  before a  Community  currency  reaches the  limits 
of  its margins  of  fluctuation>.  There  is a  presumption  that  very short-term 
financing  will  be  available  on  certain  conditions  for  intra-marginal 
intervention.  This,  together with  a  number  of other more  technical reforms,  is 
- 31  -expected  to make  the exchange  rate mechanism  of the  EMS  much  more  operative35 
However,  the fact  remains  that  the reforms  of the  September  1987  package  are 
limited in scope  and  are not  sufficient to  guarantee exchange  rate stability, 
in case of tensions,  arising from  the liberalisation of capital movements. 
Furthermore,  without  a  reinforcement  of  economic  policy  convergence,  the 
strengthening  of  the  external  constraint  resulting  from  capital  movement 
liberalisation,  could give rise to pressures for an  enlargement  of margins  of 
fluctuation  and  for  more  frequent  realignments  of  central  rates.  This  would 
carry the Community  away  from  its ultimate objective of monetary  union36• 
The  necessity  of  monetary  policy  convergence  raises  the  problem  of  what  form 
this convergence  will take.  The  choice lies between:  a>  an  alignment  of Member 
States'  monetary  policy  with  that  of  the  most  powerful  - in economic  terms  -
Member  State,  or b>  a  symmetrical  convergence  based  on  common  monetary  policy 
choices. 
Until  now  convergence  has  taken  the  first  form.  Priority  was  given  to  the 
fight against  inflation.  The  FRG,  having  the strongest  economy  and  the best 
inflation  performance,  played  a  pivotal  role in  the system,  determining the 
level  of  real  interest  rates  and  the  exchange  ra~e relationships  with  third 
currencies,  especially  the  dollar37•  The  other  Member  States,  faced 
considerable  monetary  policy  constraints,  but  were  also  able  to  reduce  the 
cost  of  deflation  because  of  the  credibility  they  acquired  by  aligning their 
monetary  policy to that of the FRG. 
In  the  future,  however,  as  monetary  stability  attains  a  more  durable  and 
credible  form,  policy  convergence  should  acquire  a  much  more  cooperative 
character.  A cooperation procedure  should be  established to define and  jointly 
manage  monetary  policy objectives.  This will aim  at achieving price stability 
with the least possible sacrifice in terms of economic  growth.  It will require 
the  use  of  a  set  of  macroeconomic  indicators  as  a  reference  framework  for 
cooperation among  Member  States and  the  adoption of  common  policy  objectives. 
The  crucial  question  here  is:  can  the  Member  States  agree  on  the  basic 
objectives  of  macroeconomic  policy  and  on  the  means  through  which  these 
objectives should  be  achieved?  A lot will depend  on  whether  such  an  agreement 
will be  feasible. 
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Great  disparities  exist  in  the  level  of  economic  development  and  living 
standards  between  the  less advanced  Member  States  and  the  Community  average 
<see  table  2>.  The  liberalisation of  capital  movements  within  the  EEC  could 
result in a  concentration of  investment  capital in the most  prosperous regions 
of  the  Community  where  more  attrative financial  investment  opportunities  may 
exist.  Moreover,  the  relatively  small-sized  unsophisticated  financial 
institutions of the less advanced  Member  States may  face great difficulties in 
adjusting  in  a  highly  competitive  environment  dominated  by  the  big 
transnational  companies  of  the  major  financial  centres.  This  would  tend  to 
aggravate  economic  and  social disparities,  and  therefore  would  threaten  the 
cohesion  of the Community.  However,  according to article 130Cb>  of the Single 
Act,  the  implementation  of  common  policies  and  of  the  internal  market  must 
take  into  account  the  objectives  of  cohesion.  This  implies  that  specific 
measures  should  be  taken  in  order  to protect  the  less advanced  Member  States 
from  the  risks  arising  from  the  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  and  to 
preserve  <or  even  strengthen>  economic  and  social cohesion  in the Community. 
The  Commission's  position on  this problem  has been  that a  more  gradual process 
of  liberalisation  should  be  adopted  in  the  less  prosperous  Member  States, 
allowing them  to extend  their period  of adjustment.  Furthermore,  as  we  have 
already said,  it has  been  proposed  that all  financial  instruments  within the 
Commission's  powers  be  used  not  only  if a  Member  State is faced  with  a  major 
crisis,  but  also to  help Member  States with  difficulties in getting ahead  on 
the road  towards  the free movement  of capital. 
Resource  transfers  from  the  structural  funds  can  also  contribute  in 
neutralizing the risks of disequilibrium deriving from  a  reinforcement of free 
competition within the Community.  Until now,  both the resources committed  and 
the results  obtained  in this field  have  been  small.  But  the  adoption  of  the 
"Delors package"  in  the summit  of February  1988  in  Brussels creates  hopes  for 
a  quantitative  and  qualitative  improvement  in structural  economic  aid  to  the 
Community's  poorer regions. 
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Real  convergence  - per capita GDP1  and  its divergence  in the Communitv 
I  1960  1970  1975  1980  1985  1986  19872 
1----------------- ----------------------------------------------------------
I 
IB  96' 1  99,5  103,0  104,4  101 '7  101 '8 
IDK  119' 8  1  16 '7  111 '3  109,5  116 '7  117' 8 
ID  118,2  1  13'  6  109,6  1  14,2  116,0  116,2 
IGR  38,7  51,7  57' 1  58,4  56' 1  55,3 
IE  58,3  72,3  80,1  73,8  72,3  72,7 
IF  101 '4  106 '1  110,4  111 '6  109,0  108,2 
IIRL  61 '9  61,4  63,0  64,7  63,8  62,3 
I  I  91 '4  100,6  97,7  102,0  103,2  103,5 
IL  141 '3  125,3  122,7  120,5  127,5  127,5 
INL  120,0  117,3  1  16'  3  112,4  107,3  106,7 
IP  38,2  47,4  50,3  54,3  52,6  53,2 
IUK  128,3  108,0  105,7  100,7  103,9  104,2 
lEUR  12  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
IRatio of 4 poorest 
Ito  4 richest  I  41 '0  56,3  63,4  60,0  58,6  58,9 
I  countries  I 
1  GDP  per capita at current prices and  purchasing power  standards as a 
2  percentage of the Community  average. 
Economic  forecast,  September  1987. 
Source:  European  Economy,  No  34,  November  1987 
101 '2 
1  15' 1 
115,6 
53,7 
73,9 
106,8 
62,7 
104,4 
127,4 
105,9 
53,8 
105,3 
100,0 
59,9 
The  aforementioned  measures  will  certainly  help  the  less  prosperous  Member 
States  to  adapt  in  a  highly  competitive  European  financial  environment.  But 
are they sufficient?  And  if not,  what  are the risks threatening these Member 
States in view  of  the full  liberalisation of  capital movements  throughout  the 
Community?  What  economic  policy  measures  should  they  adopt  in  order  to 
minimize  these  risks,  achieve  a  gradual  adjustment  of  their  economic 
structures,  and  reduce the  gap  dividing  them  from  the other  Community  Member 
States? 
No  general answer  to these difficult questions exists.  A case by  case analysis 
is  much  more  appropriate,  since  the  less  prosperous  Member  States  possess 
different economic  characteristics and  face specific structural problems. 
- 34  -In  Part  II  of  this  study,  we  will  attempt  to  provide  an  analysis  of  the 
possible  effects  of  the  liberalisation  of  capital  movements  on  the  Greek 
economy  and  to  give  general  economic  policy  guidelines  which  - if adopted  -
will  permit  a  gradual  relaxation  of  controls  without  any  major  destabilizing 
consequences. 
- 35  -PART  II  : 
THE  LIBERALISAIION  OF  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS 
AND  GREECE 
- 37  -1  The  Greek  economy 
Before  proceeding to our attempt to analyse the  implications for Greece  of the 
liberalisation of  capital  movements  in the  Community,  it would  be  useful  to 
assess the and  the general economic  performance of the country,  the character 
of the  macroeconomic  policy  pursued,  with  special reference  to exchange  rate 
policy,  and,  most  importantly,  the  situation and  problems  of  the financial 
sector.  All  these are elements which  will influence decisively the effects of 
capital movement  liberalisation on  the Greek  economy  and  their assessment will 
highlight  the  economic  policy  measures  necessary  in  order  to  proceed  to  the 
relaxation of existing controls. 
1.1  General  macroeconomic  policy and  performance 
A.  The  1960s  and  early 1970s 
During  this period Greece  experienced high rates of economic  growth  associated 
with considerable migration abroad  and  falling unemployment.  Between  1960  and 
1973,  real  GDP  grew  at an  average  annual  rate of 7.7%,  a  rate much  higher than 
the Community  average.  Public sector investment,  mainly  in infrastructure,  was 
the  main  factor  behind  rapid  growth.  However,  despite  large  increases  in 
public  expenditure,  the  public  sector  borrowing  requirement  <PSBR>  as  a 
percentage of  GDP  remained  at relatively low  levels until the early 1970s,  as 
rapid  increases  in income  led to rising government  revenues.  The  lack of any 
serious inflationary pressures was  characteristic of the period.  Although  the 
money  supply  grew  rapidly,  the  inflation rate  was  kept  at  levels  lower  than 
the Community  average.  This was  mainly due  to the absence  of any  pressures in 
the  labour  market.  External  economic  factors,  such  as  high  levels  of 
international  economic  activity,  the  relative stability of prices  of primary 
products and  raw  materials,  and  the existence of a  fixed  exchange  rate regime, 
also  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  monetary  stabili  ty38.  Trade  account 
deficits were  large  during  the  whole  period.  But  thanks  to  considerable  net 
invisible  receipts and  autonomous  capital  inflows,  the  external debt  did not 
increase much.  On  the other hand,  however,  these high  invisible receipts and 
autonomous  capital  inflows  led to  overvaluation of  the exchange  rate,  which, 
in turn,  discouraged the development  of exports39. 
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Between  1973  and  1980,  a  period  of marked  deterioration in the international 
economic  environment,  the  average  annual  rate  of  GOP  growth  fell  to  3.4%. 
Despite this slowdown,  the  growth  rates of the  Greek  economy  continued to be 
higher than the Community  average. 
Economic  policy  was  based  on  the  Keynesian  model  of  aggregate  final  demand, 
according to  which  an  increase  in  any  of  the components  of final demand  leads 
to corresponding  increases  in the  supply of  goods  and  services in  the  economy 
and  reduces  unemployment.  The  authorities  used  expansionary  monetary  and 
fiscal  policy  as  the  main  instrument  for  keeping  economic  activity  at  a 
satisfactory leve140 •  However,  private investment  activity did not respond  and 
remained  at  remarkably  low  levels.  Moreover,  the  rapid  rise  in  public 
expenditure  was  not  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  expansion  of  the  tax  and 
revenue-generating  base  of  the  economy,  thus  bringing  about  a  substantial 
increase  in  the  PSBR.  The  inability  of  government  to  finance  rising 
expenditures  through  savings  led  to  substantial  increases  in  the  supply  of 
money. 
Large  public  deficits,  expansionary  monetary  policy  and  wage  increases  in 
excess  of productivity  growth  gave  rise to  an  inflationary  wage-price spiral. 
This  wage-price  spiral  was  further  fuelled  by:  exogenous  increases  of  the 
price  of  oil  and  of  imported  goods  and  raw  materials;  rises  in the  price of 
imports  caused  by  exchange  rate  depreciation;  deliberate  increases  by  the 
government  of agricultural product  prices;  strong inflationary expectations on 
the part of households  and  firms;  certain structural  imbalances  <e.g.  monopoly 
elements and  a  large black  economy>;  and  rigidities in the supply side of the 
economy  <e.g.  overexpansion of the construction sector>,  which  made  impossible 
the satisfactory response of the various sectors to  increased demand  for their 
products41 •  The  average  rate  of  inflation  in  Greece  during  1973-80  was  16% 
compared  to 12.3%  for the Community  average.  High  inflation led to distortions 
in the allocation of production factors and  hampered  structural change. 
A large  number  of  manufacturing  firms,  being  unable  to  adjust  to  rapid  and 
substantial  increases  in unit  labour costs,  incurred significant losses.  The 
net  profit  rate  <i.e.  profits  after  depreciation  and  financial  charges  in 
relation to equity capital>  which  averaged  15%  between  1970  and  1973,  fell to 
- 40  -8~ by  1979,  with  nearly  40X  of  firms  reporting  losses.  Firms  had  to  rely 
increasingly  on  external  finance  and  were  soon  faced  with  rapidly  rising 
f .  .  1  h  42  1nanc1a  c  arges  . 
c.  The  first half of the 1980s 
The  performance  of  the  Greek  economy  during  the  first  half  of  the  1980s  was 
characterised by  sluggish growth  of output  <slightly more  than  1%  on  average>, 
high  rates  of  inflation,  substantial  external  account  imbalances,  rising 
unemployment,  particularly  among  women  and  young  people,  and  alarmingly  low 
levels of productive  investment. 
In contrast to the fiscal retrenchment  in most  OECD  countries at the beginning 
of the 1980s,  fiscal policy in Greece  remained  on  the whole  expansionary until 
mid-1985.  Government  expenditure  increased  rapidly  to  reach  48.1~ of  GOP  in 
1985.  This  was  mainly  the  result  of  considerable  increases  in  government 
consumption,  largely due  to rapid growth  of the wage  and  salary bill,  and  of 
the  rise  in  social  security  payments,  due  to  a  policy  pursued  since  the 
beginning  of  the  1  980s,  which  increased  substantially  pensions  and 
disconnected  social  security benefits  from  contributions.  Furthermore,  the 
combined  operating  deficit  of  public  corporations  and  enterprises  rose 
markedly  from  2~ of  GDP  in 1979  to  5.5~ in 1985,  2.8%  of which  was  financed  by 
government  transfers.  On  the  other  hand,  government  revenues  lagged 
considerably behind  the growth  of expenditures.  They  increased from  a  low  29~ 
of  GOP  at the  end  of  the 1970s  to only  34.5~ in 1985.  As  result,  net public 
sector debt rose from  almost  40~ of  GOP  in  1981  to  81.5~ in  1985  and  the PSBR 
from  8. 4%  of  GDP  in  1  980  to  17.  6~  in  1  985.  Public  sector  deficits  were 
financed  partly through  new  money  creation and  partly through  bank  borrowing, 
with  credit  being  administratively directed  to  the  public  sector.  As  public 
sector claims on  financial resources rose rapidly,  crowding-out  mechanisms  may 
have  become  stronger.  Moreover,  rapid growth  of the money  supply had  serious 
adverse effects on  inflation43• 
During  the first half of the 1980s,  the rate of inflation accelerated to over 
20%  on  average.  The  socialist government,  which  came  to power  in October  1981, 
first  tried  to  curb  inflation  through  price  controls,  but  this  was 
counteracted by  a  redistributive wage  policy.  Introduced  in 1982,  the policy 
aimed  at improving  the  incomes  of  the  lower  paid,  in  the hope  of encouraging 
- 41  -consumption  and  stimulating production.  A programme  of  automatic  indexation 
was  also  introduced  for  public  sector  wages,  which  soon  became  the accepted 
benchmark  in the private sector too44 . 
Declining  productivity,  rapidly  rising  unit  labour  costs  and  widespread 
controls  on  prices had  adverse  effects  on  the  profits of  enterprises.  After 
1982  the average net profit rate turned negative.  In response,  firms  increased 
their bank  borrowing to  unsustainable levels,  as evidenced  by  the  sharp rise 
in the  overall ratio of debt  to equity  to 6.9  in 1985  from  2.5  at  the  end  of 
the 1970s45• 
As  a  result  of  the  deterioration  in  the  competitiveness  of  Greek  products, 
export  performance  worsened  during  the  first  half  of  the  1980s,  despite 
greater export subsidies and  severe cuts in profit margins.  On  the other hand, 
import  penetration,  particularly in light consumer  goods,  increased markedly. 
These  developments  together with  increased payments  for oil  imports,  brought 
about  a  deterioration in the trade balance46 .  Moreover,  between  1980  and  1985 
invisible receipts decreased by$ 1.6 bn  to S 5.2 bn.  Community  transfers grew 
substantially,  but  this was  insufficient  to  counteract  the  decline  in  other 
items  <shipping,  tourism,  remittances>.  The  inflow  of  private  short-term 
capital slowed  down  too.  As  a  result,  following  the second  oil crisis,  the 
current account deficit  doubled  and  remained  around  S 2  bn  until  1984.  Then, 
in 1985,  it soared to $  3.3 bn,  nearly  10%  of GDP.  To  finance  these deficits 
foreign  borrowing  increased considerably.  The  external  debt rose  from  around 
13%  of GDP  in 1979  to  47%  in 1985. 
Economic  developments  during  the  first half  of  the  1980s  made  obvious  that, 
for a  small  open  economy  like Greece,  unilateral expansion affects mainly  the 
inflation  rate,  creates  pressures  for  devaluation  and  has  limited  and 
temporary  effects on  output and  employment.  The  authorities have  been  forced 
to recognize  that expansionary  monetary  and  fiscal policy  cannot  constitute  a 
feasible  long-term solution to the economic  problems  of the country47. 
D.  The  two-year stabilization programme 
October  1985  marked  a  major  change  in  economic  policy  attitudes.  A 
comprehensive  two-year  stabilization  programme  was  introduced48.  The  main 
objectives were  a  slowdown  in  the year-on-year  rise of  consumer  prices  to  10% 
- 42  -by  the  end  of  1987  and  a  reduction  of the  current account  deficit to around  $ 
1.25 bn,  in order  to stabilize  the level  of external  debt  from  1988  onwards. 
These  objectives  were  to  be  achieved  through  a  reduction  in  domestic  demand 
and  expenditure and  an  increase  in export  competitiveness.  All  components  of 
macroeconomic  policy  were  geared  to  these  ends.  More  specifically,  the 
.  d49  measures  compr1se  : 
a>  curbs  on  tax  evasion  and  government  expenditure,  aiming  at bringing  the 
PSBR  down  to 9.5%  of  GOP  by  1987; 
b>  a  tightening of monetary  policy through reduction in the growth  of domestic 
credit  expansion  and  through  the  gradual  establishment  of  positive  real 
interest rates for all borrowers; 
c>  a  restrictive  incomes  policy,  based  on  the  modification  of  the automatic 
indexation scheme.  Wages  were  adjusted on  the basis of projected  instead of 
past inflation after excluding the effect from  import  prices;  - d >  a  15%  devaluation  of  the  drachma,  followed  by  a  gradual  slide  of  the 
effective  exchange  rafe  to  maintain  competitiveness,  and  a  temporary 
six-month  non-interest  bearing  deposit  equivalent  to  40%  or  80%  of  the 
value of selected imported  goods50 . 
Despite  the  achievement  of  progress  towards  the  right  direction,  there  has 
been  some  slippage  in the attainment of the aforementioned  objectives51 .  The 
PSBR  fell from  17.6%  of  GOP  in 1985  to 13.74 in 1986,  mainly  due  to  increased 
taxation of  petroleum  products,  as  the  benefit  of  lower  imported  oil prices 
was  not passed  on  to final users.  However,  there were  significant shortfalls 
in  revenues  from  direct  taxes  and  social  security contributions  and  excesses 
in expenditures,  especially on  social benefits and  subsidies.  Moreover,  the 
borrowing  requirements  of  public  enterprises  were  significantly  higher  than 
projected.  In  1987  the  PSBR  remained  at  around  13.3%  of  GOP,  a  level  much 
higher  than  the  objective  set  in  the  stabilization  programme,  reflecting 
difficulties  in  the  collection  of  VAT  and  expenditure  overruns  by  public 
corporations and  entities,  notably the social security funds. 
Domestic  credit  expansion  decelerated  considerably  in  comparison  to  previous 
years.  However,  as a  result of the overrun of the PSBR  and  of a  sales volume 
of  treasury bills and  medium-term  paper  to  the  non-bank  public  substantially 
below  the  initially  projected  level,  the  rate  of  growth  of  total  domestic 
credit was  above  target  in  both  1986  and  198752 .  Nevertheless,  the  rate  of 
growth  of bank  lending to the private sector was  largely within target. 
- 43  -The  firm  implementation  of  the  restrictive  incomes  policy  produced  a  10X 
reduction  in  real  wages  and  a  7X  fall  in real  personal  disposable  income  in 
the period 1986-87.  However,  due  to initial doubts about  the durability of the 
austerity programme,  to speculative behaviour,  and  to the fact that the black 
economy  escaped  the  restrictive  effects of  the  government's  incomes  policy, 
private  consumption  contracted  much  less  than  expected,  bringing  about  a 
considerable decline  in the personal savings ratio. 
During  1986  the rise in  the consumer  price  index  was  16.9X  compared  to  25X  in 
1985,  but remained  at 15.7%  for 1987,  a  rate considerably higher than the  10% 
target  53.  This  disappointing  performance  can  be  partly  attributed  to  the 
introduction of VAT,  to some  relaxation of price controls and  to the  increase 
in agricultural prices as a  result of unfavourable weather conditions. 
The  stabilization programme  and  in particular the  moderation  of  labour  costs 
during  the  last  two  years,  together  with  some  liberalisation  of  price 
controls,  boosted profits of enterprises and  led to a  considerable  improvement 
in  the  business  climate,  evidenced  by  a  recovery  of  private  productive 
investment after years of continuous decline. 
The  current account  deficit fell to$ 1.7  bn  in  1986  and  to$ 1.3 bn  in 1987. 
The  1986  decline was  mainly due  to  the  reduction  in  imported  oil prices,  to 
the recovery  in receipts from  tourism and  remittances and  to a  60.2%  increase 
in EEC  transfers over the previous year.  The  volume  of exports grew,  spurred 
by  the  gain  in  competitiveness  secured  by  the  October  1985  devaluation,  but 
the  improvement  in  export  value  was  not  significant  because  of  the  J-curve 
effect.  The  further  decline  of  the  current  account  deficit  in  1987  was 
basically the  result  of  a  24. 4X  rise  in  export  value  and  a  30X  increase  in 
total  invisible receipts.  Non-oil  imports,  however,  in  both 1986  and  1987, 
instead of declining,  rose,  due  to the maintenance  of a  higher than projected 
level  of  demand  for  consumption,  to  inelasticity  of  industrial  demand  for 
imports of  semi-finished goods  and  equipment  and  to  continuing weaknesses  and 
rigidities in supply. 
Finally,  a  particularly remarkable development  during 1987  was  the reversal of 
the unrecorded  capital flight  of previous  years.  Net  private capital  inflows 
increased  by  66.6%  to  $  1.  4  bn,  making  stabilization  of  the  external  debt 
possible.  Private capital  inflows were  stimulated by  the rise in real interest 
- 44  -rates,  by  changes  in  expectations about  an  impeding  exchange  rate crisis and 
by  the  emergence  of  a  favourable  business  climate,  following  the  consistent 
implementation of the stabilization programme. 
1.2 Exchange  rate policy 
The  exchange  rate  is  a  very  important  economic  variable.  At  the  individual 
level,  it affects patterns of tourism and  consumer  purchases.  At  the corporate 
level,  exchange  rate changes  often make  the difference between profit and  loss 
and  have  an  important  impact  on  investment  decisions  and  therefore  on  the 
allocation  of  resources  in  the  domestic  economy.  Host  significantly,  the 
degree  of confidence  in the  home  currency  can greatly  influence international 
capital flows,  with potentially destabilizing consequences  for the balance of 
payments  <see  Chapter  2 below>. 
The  authorities  in  Greece  operate  a  managed  float  for  the  drachma.  Official 
exchange  rates  for  the  dollar  and  other  currencies  are  determined  during  the 
daily fixing session,  in which  the central bank  and  the authorized commercial 
banks  participate.  Since Greece's accession to the EEC,  the drachma  has  become 
negotiable  in the Paris exchange  market.  However,  the quantities traded there 
are  small  and  do  not  change  in  practice  the  way  in  which  exchange  rates are 
set by  the central bank. 
In March  1975,  after more  than twenty  years of a  fixed par value vis-a-vis the 
dollar,  the  Greek  authorities decided to  float the  drachma.  The  drachma  was 
allowed  to depreciate steadily against the dollar and  the EEC  currencies.  The 
pace  of depreciation accelerated during the 1980s  <see  table 3>.  The  objective 
of  the  exchange  rate  policy  of  sustained  depreciation  was  to  restore 
competitiveness,  as  the  inflation  rate  in  Greece  remained  at  substantially 
higher  levels  in  comparison  to  that  of  its main  trading partners.  However, 
depreciation lagged behind and  did not always  fully compensate  for the  loss in 
competitiveness
54
•  Moreover,  it has failed to provide a  remedy  for balance of 
payments  problems. 
- 45  -TABLE  3 
Exchange  rate developments  in Greece  <1970-1987> 
Year  drachma/dollar  Percentage  drachma/ECU  Percentage 
change  change 
1970  30.00  30.67 
1971  30.00  0.0  31.43  -2.4 
1972  30.00  0.0  33.65  -6.4 
1973  29.63  +1.2  36.95  -8.9 
1974  30.00  -1 . 2  35.78  +3.3 
1975  32.05  -6.4  39.99  -10.5 
1976  36.52  -12.2  40.88  -2.2 
1977  36.84  -0.9  42.04  -2.8 
1978  36.73  +0.3  46.78  -10.1 
1979  37.04  -0.8  50.77  -7.9 
1980  42.64  -13.1  59.32  -14.4 
1981  55.41  -23.0  61.62  -3.7 
1982  66.80  -17.1  65.34  -5.7 
1983  88.06  -24.1  78.09  -16.3 
1984  1  12.72  -21.9  88.34  -11.6 
1985  138.12  -18.4  105.74  -16.5 
1986  139.98  -1 . 3  137.42  -23.1 
1987  135.43  +3.4  156.09  -12.0 
Source:  Bank  of Greece;  European  Economy,  No.  34,  November  1987; 
and  author calculations. 
Economic  theory  helps  explain  the  limited  effectiveness  of  exchange  rate 
changes  in  correcting  external  imbalances.  Devaluation  is  an 
expenditure-switching policy which  operates through relative price changes.  To 
be  effective,  devaluation  must  lead  to  a  fall  in the  real exchange  rate and 
1  d  .  .  1  d  .  SS  Th"  .  h  11  consequent  y  to  a  re uct1on  1n  rea  omest1c  wages  .  1s  1s w at  usua  y 
happens  immediately  after an  unexpected  change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate. 
However,  the  implied  change  in  domestic  real  wages  has  little  effect  upon 
trade flows  in the  short run,  due  to  low  import  demand  elasticities and  long 
time  lags56 .  Most  importantly,  the real  income  effect of devaluation quickly 
becomes  obvious to the  inhabitants  <absence  of money  illusion>,  who  attempt to 
achieve  an  equivalent rise  in their nominal  wages.  This is particularly true 
for small open  economies,  like Greece,  in which  the proportion of  imports to 
consumption  is high.  In  the  long  run  therefore  the  initial  effect  upon  real 
wages  is offset,  due  to  resistance  to  real  wage  cuts.  Furthermore,  as the 
economy  becomes  more  open  and  trade  interpenetration increases,  the  benefits 
- 46  -of devaluation  in enhancing  the competitiveness  of exports  are also  eroded  by 
the upward  impetus  given  to import  prices which  eventually filters  through to 
prices of all goods57. 
This is what  has  largely happened  in Greece.  Empirical  evidence  supports the 
view  that  the  depreciation  of  the  drachma,  accompanied  by  expansionary 
monetary  policy,  has  fuelled  inflation  through  import  price  increases  and 
offsetting nominal  wage  changes58.  The  country has consequently been  caught  in 
an  inflation-depreciation spiral,  which  threatens economic  growth  by  hampering 
the creation of a  stable business climate favourable to productive  investment. 
Continuous  downward  exchange  rate  adjustments  have  also  reduced  competitive 
pressures on  enterprises to  lower  their operational costs  and  to  adjust their 
production  to  changing  patterns  of  international  trade  and  demand.  Finally, 
exchange  rate developments  in Greece  have  adversely affected confidence  in the 
domestic  currency,  thus giving rise to considerable illegal capital flight. 
Finally,  it should  be  mentioned  that  pricing  is only  one  factor  influencing 
the competitiveness  of Greek  products.  Other  factors,  such  as the  degree of 
product  diversification,  the  ability  of  exporters  to  penetrate  markets  by 
upgrading their sales methods,  on-time delivery,  high quality and  reliability, 
are equally  important.  The  performance  of  Greek  exports  in  the  past  has  not 
been  satisfactory in these respects. 
The  above  arguments  are now  widely recognized by  the Greek  authorities.  In the 
words  of the Governor  of the Bank  of Greece,  "exchange rate policy can  improve 
international  competitiveness  only  in  the  short  run  and  can  in  no  way  be  a 
substitute  for  policies  aiming  at  attacking  the  primary  causes  of  low 
.  .  f  d  .  d  59  compet1t1veness  o  omest1c  pro ucts"  . 
1.3 The  financial sector 
A.  Main  characteristics and  problems 
The  underdevelopment  and  inefficiency of  the  financial  sector  in  Greece  has 
been  a  central reason  behind  the  structural economic  problems  of  the country. 
Moreover,  as we  shall argue  later,  it forms  a  major  obstacle in liberalising 
- 47  -capital movements  and  in strengthening the  economy  in general.  A discussion of 
the main  characteristics of  the Greek  credit policy  and  financial  system will 
follow60 • 
A strict regulatory framework  has governed  the volume  and  allocation of credit 
in  Greece.  Monetary  policy  has  therefore  been  conducted  in  the  form  of  a 
credit policy.  Its principal means  have  been  the administrative determination 
of  interest  rates  on  deposits  and  loans  and  the  imposition  of  specific 
regulations and  direct credit controls. 
Until  recently,  an  extremely  complicated  multiple  interest  rate  system 
existed,  with  differentials  among  the  various  lending  rate  categories.  The 
authorities  have  used  interest  rates  to  promote  the  development  of  certain 
sectors  of  the  economy  and  to  discourage  what  they  regarded  as  undesirable 
economic  activities.  Underlying  economic  forces  have  not  been  taken  into 
account;  interest rates  have  been  designed to  serve the  government  incentive 
and  subsidy  policies.  Despite  the acceleration  of inflation during the  1970s 
and  first half of  the  1980s,  nominal  interest  rates were  kept at  low  levels. 
The  result was  negative real  interest rates for most  of the period. 
TABLE  4 
Long-term  interest rates in Greece 
Nominal  long-term interest rates 
1970/77  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  19871 
9,8  10,0  1 1 '2  17' 1  17,6  15,4  18,2  18,5  15,8  15,8  17,4 
Long-term  interest rates adjusted by  actual  inflation2 
1970/77  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  19871 
-1,5  -2,6  -6,2  -0,5  -2,0  -7,6  -0,8  -1 '3  -1 '5  -2,7  0,6 
~-~~~~~~~-~f-f~~~;-~~~~~-~~~;~~--------------------------------------------------
GDP  deflator 
Source  :  European  Economy,  No  34,  November  1987 
- 48  -The  activities of banks  and  specialised  credit institutions have  been  closely 
regulated and  controlled.  Apart  from  the ordinary reserve requirement  on  their 
deposits,  banks  have  also been  obliged to invest a  predetermined percentage of 
their deposits  in treasury bills and  loans to  public enterprises,  in medium-
to  long-term  loans  for  productive  investment,  and  in  loans  to  industry  and 
handicrafts.  In addition,  a  second  much  more  complex  reserve-rebate system  on 
different  credit  lines exists,  which  aims  at diminishing  the  differences  in 
the rate of return on  different lending categories,  which  result from  the fact 
that  interest  rates  are  administratively  set.  The  credit  expansion  of  the 
specialised credit institutions is earmarked  by  the central bank.  A system  of 
special  credit  controls  also  exists,  aiming  at  restricting the  provision  of 
credit for consumption  and  imports. 
The  financial  system has  been  dominated  by  the  banking sector,  especially by 
the commercial  banks61 •  On  the supply side,  more  than  904 of savings which  go 
through  the  financial  sector  take  the  form  of  bank  deposits,  the  majority 
being deposits with commercial  banks.  On  the demand  side,  private enterprises 
as  well  as  the  public  sector have  depended  excessively  on  bank  lending  for 
financing their needs. 
The  capital market,  on  the other hand,  has remained  undeveloped.  This is in 
contrast  to the  situation prevailing  in developed  economies  where  the capital 
market  constitutes  the  principal  mechanism  for  the  supply  and  allocation  of 
funds  for  long-term  investment.  The  Greek  primary capital market  is limited to 
bank  bonds  and  treasury  bills,  while  there  are  no  medium- to  long-term 
government  bonds  and  bonds  issued  by  private  enterprises.  This  largely 
determines the size of the secondary market  in which  securities change  hands. 
The  Athens  Stock  Exchange  <ABE>,  the only stock exchange  in Greece  for trading 
in officially listed securities,  is small.  This is evidenced  by  the relatively 
few  companies  listed in  the  market,  by  the  low  daily  volume  of  transactions 
and  by  the small total market  capitalization of securites traded.  The  limited 
width  and  depth of  the market  can,  in  turn,  create  serious problems  for the 
normal  formation  of prices.  Moreover,  the market  suffers from  organizational 
and  functional  shortcomings62• 
- 49  -The  main  reason  behind  the  underdevelopment  of  the  Greek  capital  market  has 
been  the  lack  of  a  regular  and  adequate  supply  of  securites  for  investors. 
Firms  have  financed  the  majority  of  their  investment  through  bank  borrowing 
rather than through the  issue of securities.  This situation has primarily been 
the result of the following factors63: 
- The  monetary  and  credit  policy  pursued  by  the  authorities  secured  easy 
access  to  bank  finance  at  low  or  even  negative  real  interest rates.  This 
combined  with  the  existence  of  close  ties between  banks  and  enterprises  -
especially big enterprises,  which  in theory have  both the potential and  the 
need  to  make  extensive  use  of  the  capital  market  - has  made  financing 
through the  issue of securities less attractive. 
- Due  to the family  character of both  large and  small  firms,  there has been  no 
distinction between  management  and  ownership.  The  diffusion in the ownership 
of shares,  which  would  result from  financing through the stock market,  was  - considered undesirable;  in such  a  case the big shareholders would  be  judged 
and  controlled  by  the  market  for  their  management  decisions  and  would 
therefore  be  less  free  to  use  the  resources  of  the  firm  for  personal 
purposes. 
- The  introduction  of  the  securities  of  a  company  in  the  stock  exchange 
creates  obligations  for  the  disclosure  of  information  on  its  financial 
position.  The  majority  of  Greek  companies  have  been  unwilling  to  provide 
such  information. 
- Finally,  the  inadequacy of supply of new  share  issues was  exacerbated by  the 
deterioration  of  the  international  and  domestic  economic  environment  after 
1973,  which  led  to  a  sharp  reduction  in  business  investment.  Moreover, 
inflation and  inflationary expectations  increased the attractiveness of bank 
financing,  by  lowering its anticipated cost. 
The  public  sector has  also  not  used  the  securities market  for  financing  its 
needs.  As  a result of  low  interest rates,  it has been  less costly to borrow 
from  banks.  Access  to  bank  borrowing  was  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  the 
monetary  authorities yielded without  difficulty to  pressures to  finance  large 
public  sector  deficits  by  relaxing  their  initial  monetary  target  for  the 
credit expansion of the economy. 
- 50  -The  situation  of  the  Greek  financial  sector described  above  resulted  in  low 
operational  <in  terms  of  costs>  and  allocative  efficiency  of  financing 
mechanisms,  with  serious adverse  consequences  on  the development  of the  real 
sector  of  the  economy.  The  most  important  among  the  consequences  will  be 
mentioned  briefly64• 
a>  The  high  degree  of  dependence  on  bank  borrowing  by  enterprises  increased 
their vulnerability  in periods  of economic  difficulties.  The  existence of 
close  ties  between  banks  and  enterprises  has  led  to  continuation  of 
financing  even  when  this was  not  warranted by  pure  economic  criteria.  The 
risk  was  therefore  transferred  to  the  banks,  which  were  subsequently 
obliged to carry the burden  of problematic firms. 
b>  The  lack  of  an  efficient  money  and  capital  market  has  enabled  banks  to 
attract peoples'  savings without  difficulty and  has  created  inertia in  the 
system.  Banks  have  not been  subjected to  competitive pressures  to provide 
new,  more  efficient  methods  for  the  mobilization  of  savings,  to  extend 
their activities  in new  sectors and  make  use  of new  financial  instruments, 
to  upgrade  the  quality  of  their  services  and  to  increase  their 
productivity.  The  absence  of  such  pressures  has  resulted  in  inflexible 
management  and  a  certain degree  of backwardness  in the banking sector. 
c>  The  administrative  determination  of  interest rates  and  the  various  direct 
credit  controls  have  increased  the  operational  costs  of  banks  and, 
consequently,  have  affected their rate of return.  Monetary  authorities have 
thus  assumed  the  responsibility  of  supporting  the  financial  position  of 
banks  and  specialised  credit  institutions.  This  has  further  reduced 
competitive  pressures  on  financial  institutions  for  the  improvement  of 
their profitability. 
d>  Credit  controls,  apart  from  being  costly,  have  also  been  of  limited 
effectiveness.  For  instance,  the fact that many  enterprises are  involved  in 
both  industrial  and  commercial  activities  has  made  possible  an  indirect 
flow  of capital from  industry to commerce. 
e>  Extensive  state  intervention  in  the  credit  mechanisms  of  the  economy  has 
led to  important distortions in the allocation of resources.  Normally,  when 
state interference  with market  forces  is kept at  a  minimum,  the unimpeded 
- 51  -interaction  of  supply  and  demand  in  money  and  capital  markets  results  in 
interest  rates  which  represent  the  real  cost  of  capital  and  leads  to  an 
efficient  allocation  of  resources  by  directing  capital  to  the  most 
productive uses65.  These  forces have  not been allowed  to operate  in Greece. 
As  a  result,  resources have  ended  up  financing the  government  deficit and 
have  flowed  to  capital-intensive projects  with  rates of return  lower  than 
the real cost of capital. 
f>  The  underdevelopment  of  the  capital  market  has  deprived  investors  of  the 
possibility of  diversifying  their portfolios  and  of  achieving  the  desired 
risk/return combinations.  The  lack  of  alternatives  for  the  placement  of 
savings  has  induced  investors  to  place  a  big part of  their assets  in real 
estate rather  than  in  securities,  in  order to  preserve the  value of their 
savings  or for  speculation.  This,  in  turn,  had  adverse  effects  on  the 
production structure of the economy. 
g>  The  lack of an  efficient securities market  and  the administrative fixing of 
interest  rates  have  imposed  important  constraints  on  the  conduct  of 
monetary  pol  icy.  The  central  bank  has  not  been  able  to  use  open-market 
operations or the discount rate as its main  monetary  policy instruments.  As 
a  result,  the efficiency of monetary  policy in controlling the liquidity of 
the economy  has been  considerably reduced. 
Furthermore,  the absence  of a  variety of opportunities for the placement  of 
savings apart  from  bank  deposits,  has  resulted  in  an  upward  trend  of  the 
liquidity  ratio  of  the  economy,  further  complicating  the  conduct  of 
monetary  policy.  Private  savings  deposits  form  an  important  component  of 
M3.  Although  these deposits can  be  withdrawn  without  any  cost,  in practice 
a  large  part  of  them  constitutes  a  long-term  placement  of  savings.  As  a 
result,  the  effects  of  changes  in  M3  on  inflation  and  the  balance  of 
payments  are  limited  in  comparison  to  what  happens  in  countries  with 
developed  money  and  capital markets.  In addition,  in periods of changes  in 
the behaviour and  expectations of savers,  the existence of a  high  liquidity 
ratio constitutes a  potential source of monetary  instability. 
- 52  -Constraints  on  the  implementation  of  monetary  policy  are  also  imposed  by 
the  inability of  the  public  sector  to  finance  its deficits  through  means 
other than  new  money  creation  or  bank  borrowing.  High  PSBRs  have  in  many 
cases necessitated the adoption of measures  which  render the achievement  of 
monetary  targets impossible. 
h>  Finally,  negative real  interest rates have  strengthened consumption  trends 
to the detriment of savings and  investment,  with serious adverse effects on 
inflation,  on  the balance of payments  and  on  economic  growth. 
B.  Recent  developments 
<i>  The  credit system 
During  recent  years  it has  been  officially recognized  that  the  credit  system 
suffers  from  important  structural  weaknesses.  Efforts  have  therefore  been 
initiated  to  bring  about  certain  changes.  The  whole  attempt  to  reform  the 
credit  system  has  acquired  new  impetus  since  the  end  of  1985.  Significant 
progress  has  been  achieved  towards  narrowing  the  differentials  between  the 
various  interest  rate  categories  and  towards  increasing  the  cost  of  bank 
lending.  For  example,  in  November  1985  a  minimum  interest rate  of  16%  was 
imposed  on  short-term bank  credit.  Then,  in June  1986  a  minimum  rate  of  15% 
was  imposed  on  medium- and  long-term bank  loans.  At  the same  time,  adjustments 
were  made  in  interest  rates  of  other  categories  of  credit  <e.g.  rates  on 
short-term  loans  to  handicraft  enterprises  were  raised>.  Measures  were  also 
taken  to  relax  a  number  of  credit  regulations  and  to  liberalise  certain 
activities66 •  The  pace  of reform accelerated during  1987. 
The  most  important  among  the measures  introduced will be  mentioned  briefly67: 
- Banks  and  other credit institutions were  allowed  to accept  time  deposits for 
a  period  of  seven  days  to  three  months  with  freely  negotiable  interest 
rates.  Later  in  the  year  the  rates offered  on  all  types  of  time  deposits 
were  liberalised. 
- A minimum  interest rate of  21%  was  imposed  on  loans which  previously carried 
maximum  rates of  20%  and  above,  with banks  free to charge whatever rate they 
wished. 
- 53  -- Interest rates on  favoured  short-term loans,  including agricultural working 
capital,  were  raised  from  1  6%  to  1  7%  and  rates  on  medium- and  long-term 
loans from  15%  to 16%. 
- The  compulsory  allocation of  15%  of  bank  deposits  for  financing  investment 
in  industry,  which  had  resulted  in  the  concentration  of  huge  amounts  of 
unused  funds  in the banks,  was  abolished. 
Commercial  banks  and  designated  specialised  credit  institutions  were 
permitted  to  issue  negotiable  certificates  of  deposit  with  maturities  of 
three,  six,  twelve  and  eighteen months  and  freely determined  interest rates. 
- Credit  institutions were  allowed  to  determine  freely  the  rates  they charge 
on  loans for plant. 
In January  1988 a  number  of  further measures  were  announced,  reaffirming the 
government's determination to liberalise the credit system,  such as68: 
- The  aforementioned  minimum  interest  rate  of  21%  on  commercial  bank  credit 
for working  capital and  on  certain  loan categories of the  Agricultural Bank 
of Greece  was  abolished. 
- The  percentage  of  obligatory deposits  on  high-rate  loans  with  the  Bank  of 
Greece  was  reduced  from  20%  to 18%. 
- The  discount rate was  reduced  from  20.5%  to 19%. 
- The  interest  rates  paid  by  the  Bank  of  Greece  on  obligatory  deposits  of 
commercial  banks  were  unified at the  level of 12.5%. 
Despite the progress made  so far,  large public sector deficits,  high rates of 
inflation and  the absence  of a  developed  money  and  capital  market,  force  the 
Bank  of  Greece  to  maintain  extensive  direct  credit  controls,  which  have 
important shortcomings.  Moreover,  the failure of attempts to limit the public 
sector  needs  for  bank  credit  has  in  certain cases  led  to the  introduction of 
contradictory measures,  such  as  the  increase  in the  compulsory  allocation of 
bank  deposits for the financing of public entities and  enterprises,  which  have 
adversely  affected  the  reform  effort.  Finally,  certain  deficiencies  and 
problems  in  the  structure  of  the  banking  sector,  such  as  the  absence  of  an 
active inter-bank  market  in  securities,  have  not  allowed  banks  to  take  full 
advantage  of reforms69. 
- 54  -<ii>  The  capital market 
After  ten  years  of  almost  continuous  decline,  the  ASE  showed  a  hesitant 
recovery during 1984-85,  with the  General  Share  Price Index  <GSPI>  up  by  40X 
in two  years.  The  recovery acquired  a  more  rapid pace  in 1986  <the  GSPI  rose 
by  69X>  and  accelerated significantly in 1987.  More  specifically,  during the 
first ten-and-a-half months  of 1987  the GSPI  rose by  434X. 
These  developments  were  the  result  of  a  considerable  increase  in  demand  for 
shares  from  local  individual  and  institutional  investors as  well  as  from  EEC 
investors  <particularly  British mutual  funds>.  The  rise  in  demand  was,  in 
turn,  stimulated  by  marked  increases  in  profits  of  enterprises and  by  the 
introduction and  firm  implementation  of the  two-year  stabilization programme, 
which  brought  about  a  favourable  business climate  and  increased  confidence  in 
the economy. 
However,  at  the end  of October  1987,  the  international stock  market  crisis, 
combined  with  the  lack  of  an  adequate  institutional  framework  which  made 
speculation  possible,  led  to  a  sharp  fall  in  prices.  Prices  fell  further 
towards  the  end  of  November  1987  due  to  certain  unfavourable  domestic 
politico-economic  developments  generating  uncertainty,  and  have  fluctuated 
since then. 
Nevertheless,  the revival of investor interest for the stock exchange  remains 
a  fact.  This probably  justifies some  optimism  for the future.  Some  companies 
have  already  started  to  issue  new  shares successfully,  and  there  are  signs 
that more  firms are thinking of participating in the ASE.  Furthermore,  the new 
draft  law  concerning  the  modernization  of  the  ASE,  which  is currently under 
discussion  and  will  soon  be  submitted  to  the  Parliament,  is  expected  to 
strengthen  the  role  of  the  market  in  the  provision  and  allocation  of 
investment  funds.  This  law  aims  at  upgrading  the  organizational  and 
operational  framework  of  the  ASE,  at  securing  more  transparency  in 
transactions and  at  improving  the supervision of the market.  However,  despite 
these favourable  developments,  it should be  recognized that the  limited supply 
of  securities  remains  a  major  weakness  of  the  Greek  financial  system,  with 
potentially destabilizing consequences. 
- 55  -2  The  Greek  economy  in the light of the liberalisation 
of capital movements  in the Community 
The  analyst attempting  to evaluate  the  implications  of the  liberalisation for 
the Greek  economy  is inevitably confronted with certain questions: 
what  have  been  the reasons  leading to the  imposition of pervasive controls 
on  outward  capital movements? 
- how  far have  these controls been  effective? 
- what  conclusions can be  drawn  about  their efficiency? 
Tentative answers  to these questions will be  given below. 
2.1  The  arguments  for the  imposition of controls on  capital outflows 
Exchange  controls  in  Greece  have  been  permanent  and  pervasive  and  have  been 
dictated by  long-term considerations.  Their main  purpose  has been  to restrict 
as far as possible outward  capital movements. 
The  concern  of  the  authorities  was  that  capital  outflows  would  lead  to  a 
considerable reduction  in available  resources to  finance  domestic  investment, 
adversely  affecting the  rate of  capital formation  and  therefore  the country's 
growth  rate.  More  specifically,  the  reasoning  behind  the  imposition  of 
controls has been  the following:  for growth  to occur  investment  is needed.  But 
savings may  be  insufficient to finance  the required  level of  investment,  thus 
creating  a  savings  gap.  This  gap  can  widen  further by  an  outflow  of savings 
abroad.  Furthermore,  development  plans  may  be  frustrated  by  the  fact  that 
export  receipts  are  not  sufficent  to  finance  certain  imports  which  are vital 
for development.  That  is,  a  foreign  exchange  gap  may  exist  as well.  Unless 
this gap  is closed,  the targeted growth  rate becomes  unattainable.  To  prevent 
the  lack of foreign exchange  from  constraining growth,  pervasive restrictions 
were  imposed  on  the export of capital,  while generous  incentives were  offered 
to stimulate the  import  of capital70 . 
- 56  -Moreover,  there was  concern that capital outflows would  reduce  the ability of 
the  government  to  tax all the  income  of  its residents,  because  of  existing 
difficulties  in  taxing  wealth  held  abroad  as  well  as  income  generated  from 
that  wealth.  Low  government  revenues  would  increase  the  country's  need  to 
borrow  from  abroad,  thereby  increasing the foreign debt burden. 
Short-term  considerations  also  formed  part  of  the  argument  for  exchange 
restrictions.  In times of economic  difficulties capital outflows would  tend to 
further  aggravate  problems.  The  currency  would  depreciate  at  a  fast  rate, 
generating  additional  destabilizing  pressures  in  the  economy.  If  the 
authorities intervened to defend  the exchange  rate,  foreign  exchange  reserves 
would  be  depleted.  This  would  create  a  need  for  more  external  borrowing. 
Sooner  or  later the  country  would  be  obliged  to  initiate balance  of  payments 
adjustment,  which  irrespective  of  whether  it  takes  place  through  .. 
expenditure-switching  or  expenditure-reducing  measures  is  painful  and 
harmful  to economic  growth. 
Finally,  it was  feared that capital outflows would  limit the effectiveness of 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  in  stimulating  investment  and  reducing 
unemployment. 
2.2 The  effectiveness and  efficiency of controls on  capital outflows 
The  effectiveness of  controls can  be  assessed:  <i>  in  terms  of  their ability 
to stem  or prevent  capital outflows,  and  Cii>  in terms  of their contribution 
to  the  relevant  economic  policy  objectives  <e.g.  high  rates  of  growth, 
increased domestic  investment,  low  levels of external debt>.  These  two  aspects 
of effectiveness  are closely related and  can hardly  be  distinguished  from  one 
another.  For  analytical  reasons,  however,  we  will  attempt  to  assess  them 
separately. 
Assessment  of  the effectiveness  of controls  in the  first narrow  and  technical 
sense  requires  an  estimate  of  whether  there  has  been  capital  flight  and  a 
measurement  of  its size. 
arriving at such  estimates. 
Unfortunately  there  are  tremendous  difficulties  in 
Firstly,  the definition of capital flight is not 
easy.  In  general,  the  term  comprises  short-term  outflows  for  speculative 
purposes  and  outflows  resulting  from  economic  or  political  uncertainties  in 
the home  country.  It is money  'fleeing from  the country'  rather than  long-term 
- 57  -investment  guided  by  economic  considerations.  In  a  wider  sense,  the  terll 
includes  the  earnings  of  residents'  foreign  assets  which  remain  outside  the 
country,  do  not contribute to financing  investment or servicing the country's 
debt,  and  therefore represent  a  loss  of resources  to the  domestic  economy71 • 
Secondly,  and  most  importantly,  obtaining accurate  information on  the size of 
capital flight is almost  impossible,  as the statistics are often collected by 
the  authorities  themselves  through  their  agents  who  carry  out  authorized 
operations. 
However,  it  is  widely  acceptable  that  circumvention  of  capital  movement 
controls in Greece  has taken place and  has been  quite extensive.  This may  have 
been  done  by  means  of both  legal substitution and  illegal evasion.  The  former 
includes  shifts  in  non-resident  holdings  of  domestic  assets  and  'leads  and 
lags',  i.e.  a  situation where  -due to  lack  of  confidence  in  the  domestic 
currency  - purchases •are  delayed  and  payments  are  accelerated.  The  latter 
includes methods  of channelling capital abroad  such as:  outright smuggling  of 
currencies,  the  transfer  abroad  of  funds  obtained  from  the  black  market  for 
foreign  currencies,  commissions  and  agents  fees  paid  by  foreign  contractors 
directly  into  foreign  bank  accounts  of  residents,  keeping  part  of  foreign 
borrowing  abroad,  and  most  notably over-invoicing imports and  under-invoicin& 
exports.  On  this  last  point,  there  are  studies  on  transfer  pricing  by 
multinationals in  Greece  showing  that many  foreign companies  have  in  the past 
been  able  to  circumvent  restrictions  and  repatriate  their  profits  by 
over-invoicing  their  exports  and  under-invoicing  their  imports72  Moreover, 
studies  by  the  OECD  have  shown  that  in  periods  of  strong  speculative 
pressures,  capital  movement  controls  have  been  largely  ineffective  in 
preventing  reserve  changes  or  exchange  rate  adjustments  both  in  countries 
using  temporary  controls  and  in  countries  using  permanent  controls  73•  This 
holds true for Greece  too.  For  instance,  the Governor  of the central bank  in 
his  Report  for  1986,  recognizes  that  the  strengthening  of  inflationary 
expectations and  of  expectations  for  a  new  devaluation  of  the  drachma  during 
the last months  of  1985 and  the first  months  of  1986  increased  capital flight 
abroad74.  In  normal  times,  however,  controls  are  likely to  have  been  more 
effective  in  stemming  capital  outflows,  partly  because  their circumvention 
involves  significant  costs  and  risks  which  sometimes  offset  the  expected 
benefits. 
- 58  -The  assessment  of  the  effects  of  exchange  controls  on  economic  growth, 
investment,  the  exchange  rate,  the  balance  of  payments,  etc.,  is equally 
complicated.  It is extremely difficult to distinguish the effects of controls 
from  those  of  other  economic  policy  measures.  An  accurate  and  objective 
analysis  would  actually  require  a  counterfactual  exercise.  Ideally  the 
comparison  should  be  made  between  the  economic  performance  of  Greece  during 
the  last  thirty  years  and  its  performance  during  the  same  period  had  the 
controls not  existed.  Differing economic  performance  could  then be  attributed 
to  differences  in  the  system  of  capital  movement  controls.  Unfortunately  in 
·the real world  such comparisons  are  impossible. 
In more  general  terms,  however,  it can  be  said that the  imposition of strict 
restrictions on  capital outflows has  not  succeeded  in promoting  investment  and 
fostering economic  growth.  As  we  have  already said,  although economic  growth 
was  buoyant  during  the  1 960s,  internal  structural  economic  imbalances  were 
building  up,  which  became  apparent  later,  when  the  external  economic 
environment  deteriorated  sharply.  Exchange  restrictions - to the  extent  that 
they  succeeded· in  stemming  capital  outflows  - have  not  been  able  to  reverse 
the downward  trend  of  private  investment  activity  and  to  protect  the  country 
from  severe balance of payments  problems.  Savings abstracted from  leaving the 
country have  not been  transformed  to productive  investment.  And,  despite the 
marked  depreciation  of  the  drachma,  current  account  deficits  remained  large 
and  the external debt rose to  47%  of  GRP  by  1985. 
Most  significantly,  the  imposition  of  comprehensive  and  permanent  exchange 
controls  proved  to  be  a  highly  inefficient  economic  policy  instrument  which 
led  to  considerable  distortions  in  the  economy.  Controls  have  in  practice 
operated  as  a  subsitute  for  a  strategy  designed  to  correct  the  underlying 
disequilibria  in  the  economy.  By  suppressing  market  forces,  they  have 
sheltered  governments  from  the  repercussions  of  their  actions.  They  have 
allowed  the  pursuit of  unsound  overexpansionary  monetary  and  fiscal  policies, 
and  made  possible  the  prevalence  of  low  nominal  and  negative  real  interest 
rates for many  years  <see  Section 1.3 of Part  II>.  The  disastrous consequences 
of  these  developments  on  growth,  investment,  savings,  monetary  stability, 
resource  allocation,  the  balance  of  payments  and  the  structure  of  the 
financial sector have  already been  analysed  and  discussed. 
- 59  -The  distortions  created  by  the  imposition  of  extensive  restrictions  on  the 
outflow  of  capital  make  relaxation  of  controls  particularly  difficult  and 
risky,  thus creating great obstacles to Greece's compliance  with EEC  rules in 
the field of the  liberalisation of capital movements.  Despite the existence of 
considerable difficulties,  during recent years an  effort has been  initiated to 
open  the  Greek  economy  to two-way  capital flows.  Nevertheless,  considerable 
uncertainty  remains  over  the  possible  effects  of  the  liberalisation.  This 
uncertainty is justified if we  take  into  account  the  economic  problems  of the 
country  as  well  as  the  fact  that  capital  movements  are  often  the  result  of 
intangible factors.  The  analysis that follows  is aimed  at highlighting some  of 
the factors  which  might  influence outward  capital movements  from  Greece  after 
a  relaxation of restrictions,  and  at providing a  stimulus for further and  more 
detailed research  in this issue. 
2.3 The  liberalisation of outward  capital movements: 
possible effects and  implications for economic  policy 
It is extremely difficult to predict - and  even  more  so  quantify - the effects 
of  the  liberalisation  on  the  Greek  economy.  Exchange  controls  have  been 
permanent  and  pervassive,  and  until  1986  there  had  been  no  efforts  for their 
relaxation.  Therefore,  we  have  no  past  experience of an  attempt  to liberalise 
capital  movements  on  which  we  could  base  our  analysis.  Furthermore,  the 
factors  influencing  capital  flows  are  particularly  complex  and  may  be  only 
indirectly related to pure  economic  considerations.  Especially for short-term 
capital  movements,  confidence  and  expectations  play  an  important  role. 
Economic  theory has not  managed  yet to provide any  universally accepted method 
for describing  or modelling  the formation  of expectations  and  their  impact  on 
capital flows75•  A considerable amount  of conceptual and  empirical research is 
still required  in this field. 
Firstly,  a  distinction must  be  made  between  the capital operations which  have 
already  been  liberalised  at  the  Community  level  by  the  Directives  of  1960, 
1962  and  1986  <although  there  are  Member  States  which  still  apply 
restrictions>,  and  the rest of capital operations,  the  liberalisation of which 
forms  the  object  of  the  recent  Commission  proposal  for  a  new  Directive  <see 
again Chapter  2  of Part  I>. 
- 60  -A.  Capital operations already liberalised at the Community  level 
In  Greece  these  capital  operations  are  subject  to  different  restrictions, 
according  to  whether  the  transaction  is  made  by  Greek  residents  or  by 
non-residents.  As  far  as  outward  capital  movements  by  non-residents  are 
concerned,  as we  have  already said,  important measures  were  introduced  in 1986 
and  1987  liberalising  the  repatriation  of  capital  <as  well  as  profits, 
dividends  and  capital  gains>  imported  to  Greece  for  the  purpose  of  direct 
investment  or  for  investment  in real  estate and  securities. 
very  early  to  draw  any  concrete  conclusions  on  the 
liberalisation76. 
It is, 
results 
however, 
of  this 
The  first  signs  have  been  positive.  The  announcement  of  the  liberalisation 
measures  has  been  followed  by  a  significant  inflow  of  non-resident  capital. 
The  inflow of venture capital,  which  had  fallen by  7.7%  during the first half 
of  1986,  rose by  13.8%  during the second  half of the year,  bringing about  an 
overall annual  increase of 3.8%  in relation to 1985.  This  favourable  trend was 
reaffirmed  during  1987  when  venture  capital  inflows  increased  by  30.7%  in 
relation to  1986.  To  this contributed significantly the substantial  inflow  of 
capital for  the purchase  of  Greek  securities,  as  the  revival  of  activity  in 
the  ABE  attracted the interest of foreign  investors77 . 
The  inflow of capital for the purchase  of real estate followed  a  similar - and 
even  more  remarkable  - path.  While  it  had  fallen  by  9.1%  during  1985  in 
relation  to  the  previous  year  and  by  13.8%  during  the  first  three  months  of 
1986,  it subsequently experienced an  accelerating rate of increase,  leading to 
an  overall annual  rise of 7.4%  for 1986.  During  1987  the  inflow of capital for 
the purchase  of real  estate reached  astonishingly high  levels,  increasing  by 
45.7%  over  1986. 
It  is  almost  impossible,  however,  to  disentangle  the  impact  of  the 
liberalisation measures  on  the  aforementioned  capital  inflows from  the  impact 
of  other  favourable  economic  developments  which  took  place  during  1986  and 
1987.  The  firm  implementation  of the  stabilization programme  brought  about  a 
general  improvement  in  the  business  climate,  by  indicating  that  Greece  is 
moving  towards  more  sound  policies for  the solution  of its economic  problems. 
The  increase  in  the  profits  of  enterprises  had  a  favourable  impact  on 
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 investment  prospects.  Moreover,  it led to a  rise in the value of their shares. 
This  together  with  a  deceleration  in  the  depreciation  rate  of  the  drachma, 
increased the expected rate of return on  Greek  securities.  Consequently,  their 
purchase  appeared  as  a  promising  investment  opportunity  to  foreign  investors 
trying  to  diversify  their  portfolios.  The  government's  recognition  that 
devaluation  does  not  constitute  a  feasible  and  desirable  long-term  solution 
also had  a  favourable  impact  on  investor confidence. 
Nevertheless,  the contribution of the liberalisation measures  to the  increased 
inflow  of  investment  capital  is  beyond  doubt.  Foreign  individuals  and 
enterprises investing  in Greece,  apart from  pure economic  factors,  are  also 
particularly  concerned  about  their  ability  to  repatriate  their  profits  and 
capital at some  point  in the future,  if they decide it is in their interest to 
do  so.  Restrictions on  the repatriation  of profits and  capital  can  therefore 
operate as  a  disincentive  and  discourage  capital  inflows,  while abolition  of 
such  restrict  ions  usually  brings  about  the  opposite  result.  The  adopted 
liberalisation  measures  were  perceived  as  a  sign  of  changing  government 
attitudes  towards  more  liberal,  market-oriented  policies  and  increased 
investor  confidence  over  the  safety  and  flexibility  of  their  capital  when 
investing in Greece. 
However,  it  should  be  recognized  that  the  abolition  of  restrictions  on 
non-resident  outward  capital  movements  renders  the  balance  of  payments  more 
vulnerable  to  changes  in  domestic  and  external  economic  factors.  This  is 
particularly true  for  investment  by  non-residents  in Greek  securities,  which 
is a  rather  liquid  and  flexible  form  of  investment.  As  the  participation of 
foreign  investors  in  the  Greek  capital  market  increases,  so  does  the 
sensitivity  of  the  capital  account  balance  with  respect  to  changes  in 
differentials in  the perceived  risk-adjusted rate  of return  on  Member  States' 
securities.  A deterioration in the rate of return on  Greek  securities,  a  rise 
in long-term  interest rates abroad,  or expectations about  a  devaluation of the 
drachma,  could  all  lead  to  capital  outflows,  as  investors  try  to  maximize 
their profits and  preserve  the value  of their assets.  This,  as we  shall see 
later  in  our  analysis,  has  important  implications  for  the  future  conduct  of 
Greek  economic  policy. 
- 63  -Outward  capital  movements  by  Greek  residents  falling  within  this category  of 
capital  operations  are still subject to  important restrictions.  According  to 
the Commission  Decision 87/152/EEC,  Greece  must  abolish these restrictions by 
22  November  1988.  Even  if the  decision is renewed  and  a  further  extension is 
obtained,  at some  point  in the future Greece  will have  to abolish the existing 
restrictions.  Here  an  attempt will  be  made  to analyse  the factors  which  will 
determine  the effects of such  an  abolition. 
- Direct  investment: 
This  type  of  investment  is mainly  influenced  by  long-term  considerations  and 
is less  affected  by  short-term  factors  and  currency  unrest.  It is  made  and 
liquidated  according  to  the  investor's  assessment  of  production  conditions. 
While  production  conditions  in  other  EEC  Member  States  have  a  number  of 
advantages  in  terms  of  infrastructure,  natural  resources,  transport  costs, 
know-how,  etc.,  the disturbance from  capital exports by  residents for direct 
investment  abroad  is not  expected  to  be  great,  especially  if  we  take  into 
account  the relatively  low  competitiveness and  small size of Greek  enterprises 
in most  sectors of the economy.  Greek  enterprises with  a  comparative  advantage 
over  European  ones  are  usually  found  in  labour  intensive  sectors.  These 
enterprises  are  not  likely to  increase  their competitiveness  by  investing  in 
other Member  States,  where  labour costs are higher78.  Furthermore,  investment 
abroad  may  entail higher costs for the acquisition of adequate  information and 
for market  research,  and  may  involve greater uncertainty and  risk.  However, 
residents'  interest  in  investing  abroad  may  increase  as  Greek  firms  and 
entrepreneurs  modernize  and  adapt  to  stiff  competition  within  the  EEC 
resulting  from  the  completion  of  the  internal  market.  The  reaction  of 
investors will depend,  among  other things,  on  the prevailing domestic  economic 
situation.  A lack of  investment  opportunities at home  may  induce  investors to 
search for alternatives in other Member  States.  On  the contrary,  a  favourable 
investment  climate,  1  ike  the  present  one,  would  tend  to  keep  domestic 
investment  resources  at  home  and  to  attract  foreign  investment  funds  from 
abroad.  Finally,  it should  also  be  noted  that  direct  investment  abroad  by 
residents  may  in  certain  cases  generate  inflows  of  funds  too,  as  investors 
repatriate part of their profits and  capital gains. 
- 64  -- Investment  in real estate and  personal capital movements: 
Investment  in real estate can  take place for the purpose  of personal use,  for 
securing  a  steady  flow  of  income  and/or  for  speculative  reasons  <i.e. 
expectation  of  capital  gains  from  future  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the 
asset>.  Investors  interested  in  owning  property  abroad  for  personal  use  are 
usually  wealthy  individuals  and  most  of  them  may  have  already  been  able  to 
export  capital  abroad  for  this purpose  either  legally  <e.g.  in  the  case  of 
shipowners>  or  illegally.  Those  interested  in  purchasing  real  estate  abroad 
for securing a  steady flow  of  income,  may  decide to do  so if the perceived net 
rate  of  return  is  higher  compared  to  that  on  alternative  equally  riskless 
types  of  investment  at  home  or  abroad.  However,  due  to  the  variety  and 
specificity of  factors  influencing  such  decisions  and  to  the  important  role 
played by  personal preferences,  it is particularly difficult to forestall even 
the  approximate  size  of  capital  outflows  for  this  purpose.  As  far  as 
speculation is concerned,  if we  take  into account  the greater difficulty and 
higher  cost  of  obtaining  information  about  real  estate  price  trends  abroad, 
and  the  greater  risk  and  uncertainty  involved,  it is  hard  to  imagine  that 
there  will  be  many  people  in  Greece  interested  in  this  form  of  speculative 
investment.  Nevertheless,  even  in the  case where  large capital  outflows for 
the purchase  of  real  estate  abroad  created  balance  of  payments  problems,  it 
would  be  relatively  easy  for  the  government  to  restrict  and  control  them, 
trying to distribute them  more  equally over time. 
The  liberalisation  of  personal  capital  movements  <gifts  and  endowments, 
inheritances,  transfers of capital belonging to residents who  emigrate,  etc.> 
is not  expected  to  affect  greatly  the  balance  of  payments.  The  amounts  of 
money  involved  in these transactions are usually not  large.  Furthermore,  there 
have  already  been  attempts  to  liberalise  these  transactions  through 
international agreements. 
- Operations  in securities: 
The  liberalisation of  operations  in  securities will  provide  savers  with  new 
opportunities for diversifying their portfolios and  for  increasing the rate of 
return on  their investments.  The  crux of the matter is how  investors are going 
to  react.  Firstly,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  institutional  and 
individual  investors. 
- 65  -Institutional investors consist of social funds,  investment  funds,  insurance 
companies,  some  specialised credit  institutions,  such  as the  Postal  Savings 
Bank,  etc.  The  participation of these  investors in the domestic capital market 
has  been  very  limited  until  nowadays.  The  opening  of  new  opportunities  for 
investing  in  foreign  low-risk  fixed-income  securites  will  offer  them  the 
chance to improve  the rate of return on  their investments.  However,  the fact 
that the majority  of  these  institutions are  controlled  by  the  state  may  put 
limits  on  their  freedom  to  take  full  advantage  of  new  opportunities. 
Consequently,  their reaction to the liberalisation will take  into account  the 
general macroeconomic  objective of  stability and  will not  create problems  for 
the balance of  payments.  The  rest of  the institutional  investors who  are not 
controlled by  the state will base  their investment  decisions on  pure  economic 
criteria;  the comparison  will be  made  between  the rate of return  on  low-risk 
investments  in securities at home  and  abroad. 
Individual  investors belong  in different economic  classes.  The  size of  their 
wealth  influences  their  reaction  to  the  liberalisation  of  the  purchase  of 
foreign  securi  tes.  For  the  top  economic  class  consisting  of  shipowners  and 
large industrialists nothing will actually change.  The  former  have  never been 
subjected  to  restrictions  and  could  always  move  their  capital  outside 
Greece79•  The  latter,  even  when  subjected to restrictions,  have  been  able to 
circumvent  controls and  export  much  of their capital abroad.  Approximately  the 
same  holds  true  for  these  individuals  which,  while  not  belonging  in  the top 
class,  are  nevertheless  quite  wealthy.  However,  the  decisions  of  these 
individuals will not  be  unaffected  by  the  liberalisation.  The  flexibility of 
investing their capital abroad  will be  increased,  while  the cost  of doing so 
will  be  reduced  <i.e.  the  cost  of  the  commission  charged  to  obtain  foreign 
exchange  and  to  transfer  it illegally abroad  will  be  eliminated>,  and  there 
will  be  no  more  risks  associated  with  the  illegal  export  of  capital.  The 
change  will be  considerably greater for the individuals belonging to the  lower 
economic  classes.  Each  of  them  possesses  a  relatively  small  amount  of 
investment  capital,  but  the  total  of  their savings  is considerable.  Until 
nowadays  these  individuals  have  mainly  placed  their savings  in  bank  accounts 
and  in real estate,  and  have  stayed  away  from  the  capital  market.  The  main 
reason  behind  this has  been  the  small  size  and  underdevelopment  of  the Greek 
capital market.  After the  liberalisation,  these  individuals will  be  free  to 
invest  in  more  sophisticated  financial  instruments  in  other  Member  States' 
capital markets.  A lot will depend  on  their reaction. 
- 66  -At  first sight,  one  could  say that,  in the absence  of an  economic  crisis which 
would  tend to  increase  investors'  concerns about  preserving the value of their 
capital,  small  investors will not take full advantage  from  the opportunity of 
investing in foreign securities.  This is due  to a  variety of reasons.  As  far 
as shares  are concerned,  the risk  of large  losses frightens  Greek  investors, 
who  have  a  remarkable  lack  of  experience  with  investing  in  the  stock  market. 
Moreover,  there are difficulties in obtaining information about  the financial 
position of foreign enterprises.  As  far as low-risk securities are concerned, 
the  possibly  limited  knowledge  about  existing  opportunities  abroad,  the 
existence  of  higher  transactions  costs  and  the  general  perception  that 
investment  abroad  is more  risky and  uncertain may  tend to discourage residents 
from  participating in other Member  States'  capital markets. 
However,  things are not static and  the behaviour of small  investors may  change 
as  they  become  better  acquainted  with  the  opportunities  of  investing  in  the 
stock  exchange.  The  government's  present policy  to reform  the banking  system 
and  to  promote  the  development  of  the  capital  market  may  contribute  to this. 
Furthermore,  as progress is made  towards  the realization of a  unified European 
market  in  financial  services,  long-established  foreign  brokerage  firms  with 
large groups  of highly  competent  analysts  and  with  experience  in  the field of 
portfolio management,  may  enter  the Greek  market.  These  firms  may  differ in 
the type  of clientele they will try to build up.  For  instance,  some  may  mainly 
deal with  investors of modest  means  who  are primarily interested  in preserving 
their capital  and  securing  a  steady  flow  of  income,  while  others  may  seek 
wealthier  customers  who  are  more  interested  in  making  large  profits  by 
investing  a  proportion  of  their savings  in  relatively  high-risk  securities. 
These  firms may  end  up  managing  a  large part of  investors'  savings.  But  such  a 
change  in  investment  attitudes of  Greek  investors,  particularly small  ones, 
may  take a  long  time  to occur. 
Nevertheless,  assuming  that  Greek  investors  will  become  more  familiar  with 
investing in the capital market,  subsequent  capital outflows for the purchase 
of  foreign  securities  will  depend  on  perceived  differences  in  the  rate  of 
return  between  Greek  securities  and  foreign  ones.  Since  Greek  residents  are 
usually  interested  in  the  rate  of  return  in  domestic  currency  terms,  the 
comparison  will  be  made  between  the  nominal  rate  of  return  on  domestic 
securities <rd>  ~1d the total rate of return on  foreign securities in domestic 
currency.  This  latter  comprises  the  nominal  rate  of  return  on  foreign 
- 67  -securities  in  foreign  currency  <rf>  and  the  expected  change  in  the  exchange 
rate  of  the  drachma  vis-a-vis  the  currency  in  which  the  security  is 
denominated  Ce*>,  over a  time-period  equal  to the term  of the security80  An 
outflow of capital will result as  long  as 81 :  rd<rf  +  e*. 
In  normal  periods,  when  no  great  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  are expected, 
capital  outflows  will  mainly  be  a  function  of  differentials  in  the  rate  of 
return between domestic  and  foreign securities.  Even  if moderate  depreciation 
of the drachma  is expected,  a  higher nominal  interest rate on  Greek  securities 
may  compensate  investors and  persuade them  to hold  domestic  assets  instead of 
foreign  ones.  Moreover,  as  long  as  substitutability  between  domestic  and 
foreign  assets  is not  perfect  - due  to difficulties  in information  and/or to 
differences in  investors'  preferences  associated with  investing abroad  - some 
negative difference may  continue to exist between  rd and  Crf  +  e*>,  even  after 
the liberalisation82.  Therefore,  if interest rates on  Greek  securities are set 
at  competitive  levels,  the  abolition  of  controls  on  portfolio  operations  in 
EEC  securities need  not create problems  for the balance of payments. 
On  the other hand,  however,  the paucity of opportunities for  investing in the 
ABE,  due  to its limited width anrl  depth,  may  induce  investors to turn to other 
Member  States'  capital  markets  for  placing  their  savings.  Indeed,  the 
underdevelopment  of  the  domestic  capital  market  is  one  of  the  main  factors 
making  the  liberalisation  of  operations  in  foreign  securities  particularly 
difficult.  Studies  by  the  OECD  have  shown  that  the  countries  imposing 
relatively strict  restrictions  on  international  portfolio  operations  "are  in 
most  cases  precisely  those  where  there  have  been  relatively  underdeveloped 
capital markets with a  very narrow  range of financial  investments available to 
domestic  investors"83 . 
Futhermore,  it should be  noted that,  immediately after the liberalisation of 
operations in EEC  securities,  capital outflows could occur for diversification 
purposes.  International  diversification  can  be  an  important  instrument  for 
reducing risk84.  While  the  return  of  a  portfolio  is the  weighted  average  of 
the returns of  the  individual  stocks,  the  risk  of a  portfolio is not  simply 
the  sum  of  the  component  risks  of  the  securites  comprising  it.  This  arises 
from  the  fact  that  the  returns  of  individual  securities  may  move  together or 
interact  to  a  certain  degree,  i.e.  they  may  have  a  certain  degree  of 
covariance.  By  invP.sting  in foreign securities,  this covariance is potentially 
- 68  -reduced,  since  securities'  prices  in  different  EEC  markets  do  not  move 
together  in a  highly synchronized  fashion.  National  economies  are  subject to 
different  socioeconomic  and  political  domestic  forces  and  are  affected  in 
differing  degrees  by  external  economic  disturbances.  Since  the  returns  on 
securities  in  different  markets  do  not  move  in  an  identical  manner,  the 
opportunity  exists  to  reduce  the  uncertainty  of  portfolio  returns  by 
diversifying  accross  EEC  markets85.  But  the  fact  that  Greek  investors  have 
little  experience  with  investing  in  the  stock  exchange,  implies  that  the 
immediate  one-off diversification effect on  the Greek  balance of payments  will 
probably be  moderate.  Diversification may  take place more  gradually,  as Greek 
investors  begin  to  make  use  of  more  sophisticated  portfolio  management 
techniques. 
In periods of economic  crisis,  however,  the emergence  of strong expectations 
for  devaluation  of  the  drachma  will  tend  to  increase  considerably  the 
difference between  rd  and  <rf  +  e*>.  Investors,  trying to preserve the value 
of  their  capital,  will  rush  out  of  drachma  denominated  assets  into  assets 
denominated  in  other  EEC  currencies  considered  to  be  stronger.  Expectations 
about  nominal  exchange  rate changes  therefore become  particularly important  in 
determining capital flows.  Investors'  expectations are generally influenced by 
developments  in  real  and  nominal  economic  variables,  such  as  productivity 
trends,  shifts in the current account  balance,  and  changes  in inflation rate 
differentials.  By  observing  these  developments,  investors  try  to  determine 
whether  a  currency  is overvalued or undervalued.  If the current exchange  rate 
is viewed  as overvalued,  then it is likely that the currency will be  devalued 
'  at some  point  in the future.  In Greece  expectations about  the future domestic 
inflation rate  play  a  very  important  role.  Investors'  past  experience  with 
Greek  exchange  rate  policy  has  shown  that  the  government  is  unwilling  to 
permit  an  excessive  erosion  of  export  competitiveness  caused  by  large 
inflation rate differentials,  and  finally resorts to currency devaluation as a 
way  to restore competitiveness. 
Besides the pure  economic  factors,  investors'  expectations are also influenced 
by  political and  human  factors which  affect confidence.  Whether  the economy  is 
in  a  good  or  bad  shape,  it  is  the  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  of  the 
government  which  attract  attention.  It  is  believed  that  the  best  way  to 
protect  the  domestic  currency  is not  by  intervening  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets,  but  by  pursuing sound  economic  policies.  Indeed,  investors are great 
- 69  -believers in economic  policy conservatism and  will act accordingly.  The  Greek 
experience  of  the  last  two  years  supports  that  view.  Domestic  and  foreign 
investors  have  reacted  favourably  to  the  change  in  government  policy 
attitudes,  as  evidenced  by  the  remarkable  increase  in  private  capital 
.  fl  86  1n  ows  . 
Therefore,  in  periods  of  economic  and  political uncertainty,  capital  seeks 
safety to the exclusion of all other factors.  Even  a  big difference between  rd 
and  rf  may  not  be  sufficient  to  stem  resident  and  non-resident  capital 
outflows  and  to  attract  capital  from  abroad87  In  such  circumstances  the 
adverse effects  of large  capital outflows  on  the  balance of  payments  could be 
significant.  As  inve5tors  moved  out  of  drachma  denominated  assets,  the 
domestic  currency  would  come  under  great  pressure  and  would  inevitably 
depreciate.  Depreciation  by  raising  import  prices  and  by  inducing offsetting 
nominal  wage  increases  would  result  in  an  acceleration  in  the  rate  of 
inflation,  further  increasing  the  inflation  differential  between  Greece  and 
the  other  EEC  Member  States.  This,  in  turn,  would  strengthen  expectations 
about  future  devaluation  further  stimulating  capital  outflows.  Expectations 
would  in  this way  become  self-fulfilling.  Exchange  rate  changes  could  become 
greatly  exaggerated  and  feed  on  themselves.  A  vicious  circle  of  capital 
outflows-depreciation-inflation  might  result,  which  would  be  particularly 
difficult to break. 
If the authorities intervened to support the drachma,  they would  deplete their 
reserves.  Community  credit mechanisms  could help  finance part  of the  loss in 
reserves.  But  intervention to support a  currency is a  policy unsustainable  in 
the  long  run.  The  effectiveness of  such  a  policy in  the short run depends  on 
its  success  in  restoring  confidence  in  the  currency.  Experience  shows  that 
when  investors  believe  that  economic  policy  is  partly  responsible  for  the 
crisis,  it  becomes  particularly  difficult  for  the  domestic  authori  tes  to 
influen~e their decisions.  The  government,  being unable  to reverse the outflow 
of capital,  would  be  obliged to reintroduce capital movement  controls.  But  the 
effectiveness  of  controls  would  probably  be  even  more  limited  than  before. 
Moreover,  once reintroduced,  it would  be  extremely difficult to proceed to a 
re-relaxation of controls in the future.  As  the credibility of the government 
would  be  seriously  impaired,  investors  would  probably  hurry  to  move  their 
capital out of the country as soon  as controls were  lifted. 
- 70  -The  above  analysis  makes  clear  that  the  liberalisation  of  outward  capital 
movements  by  residents,  which  would  allow  Greece  to  comply  with  Community 
rules,  would  have  to  take  place  in  a  relatively  stable  macroeconomic 
environment.  Otherwise,  the consequences  on  the balance of payments  could  be 
significant88.  Some  prior  development  and  strengthening  of  the  domestic 
capital  market  would  also  be  required.  Subsequently,  macroeconomic  policy 
would  have  to be  geared to the objective of external stability.  The  government 
would  have  to  pursue  a  more  active  interest  rate  policy  so  as  to  ensure 
internationally competitive yields on  domestic assets.  This  implies that yield 
differentials would  have  to  vary  in  response  to  changing  market  expectations 
about  exchange  rates.  In  the absence  of a  sufficiently stable drachma,  high 
interest  rate  differentials  might  become  a  market  necessity  in  order  to 
dissuade  investors  from  moving  their capital  outside the  country.  This  would 
be  costly for the Greek  economy.  To  avoid  this cost it would  be  necessary and 
advisable to  pursue  a  firm  exchange  rate policy  aiming at  currency stability. 
This  would  require  keeping  inflation rate differentials at  low  levels.  This, 
in turn,  would  have  implications for  the conduct  of fiscal  policy,  since it 
would  deprive  the  government  of  the  prerogative  of  financing  a  large  part of 
its deficit  through  the  so-called  "inflation tax".  The  fiscal  deficit  would 
therefore  have  to  be  reduced  at sustainable  levels.  Finally,  the government 
would  have  to  keep  a  predictable  and  credible  stance  with  a  view  to 
strengthening  investors'  confidence  in  the  economy  and  securing  a  stable 
economic  environment  favourable  to  investment. 
B.  The  full  liberalisation of capital movements 
A  similar  method  to  the  one  used  in  the  case  of  international  portfolio 
operations  in  securities dealt  in  on  the  Member  States  capital  markets  can 
also be  used  for analysing the effects of the full  liberalisation of financial 
operations  in  the  Community.  Resident  and  non-resident  investors  trying  to 
decide  whether  to  place  their  funds  in  Greece  will  compare  nominal  domestic 
interest  rates with  foreign  interest rates suitably  adjusted  to  take  account 
for  the  expected  exchange  rate  change  of  the  drachma.  As  with  operations in 
capital market  securities,  a  negative difference between  these two  rates would 
result  in capital outflows. 
- 71  -There  are,  however,  tremendous  quantitative and  qualitative differences with 
the previous case.  As  far  as Greece  is concerned,  this is particularly true 
for investments  in deposits with banks.  This is so for the following reasons. 
Firstly,  the  proportion  of  deposits  with  banks  in  the  portfolios  of  the 
majority  of  Greek  residents  is particularly  large.  Secondly,  this type  of 
investment  is sufficiently  liquid,  so  that  the  related  funds  can  easily be 
transferred from  one  Member  State to the other.  Thirdly,  Greek  investors are 
particularly familiar  with this type of  investment,  and  therefore it will be 
easier  for  them  to  recognize  the  existence  of  differences  in  the  rate  of 
return.  While  there may  still be  additional  information and  transactions costs 
associated  with  investing  abroad,  these  are  not  likely to  be  large  and  are 
expected to diminish over time,  as the financial  integration of the Community 
increases.  Finally,  placing  savings  with  the  banking  system  is a  low-risk 
investment;  investing  abroad  instead  of at  home  is not perceived  as carrying 
increased  risks  as  in  the  case  of  investing  in  capital  market  securities. 
Consequently,  the  existence  of  even  small  negative  exchange-risk  adjusted 
interest  rate  differentials  between  Greece  and  the  other  EEC  Member  States 
would  normally result in massive  and  overwhelming  capital outflows. 
As  Greek  investors  become  better acquainted  with  existing  opportunities  for 
investing  in  short-term  money  market  financial  instruments,  capital  flows 
associated with this type  of  investment,  will also  become  more  responsive to 
expected  interest rate and  exchange  rate changes. 
The  implications of the full  liberalisation of capital movements  are obviously 
far-reaching.  However,  they  should  be  viewed  within  a  framework  of  close 
monetary  integration in the Community.  The  task of fully liberalising capital 
movements  appears to be  extremely difficult not  only for Greece,  but also for 
other  countries,  like  France  and  Italy,  which  continue  to  apply  exchange 
restrictions89•  Full liberalisation of capital movements  means  that Greece  as 
well  as  all other  EEC  Member  States would  have  to  manage  the  whole  range  of 
their  interest  rates  and  conduct  their  monetary  policy  with  a  view  to 
maintaining exchange  rate stability <or,  in this case,  fixity>. 
Concern  is  often  expressed  that  growing  capital  flows  stimulated  by 
deregulation  and  financial  innovation  would  create  strong  speculative 
disturbances  in  national  economies.  Especially  in  small  countries,  like 
Greece,  it might  be  particularly  difficult  for  the  authorities  to  defeat 
- 72  -speculators by  intervening in  the foreign  exchange  markets.  But  this concern 
is  not  necessarily  warranted.  In  the  event  of  speculative  pressures,  a 
strengthened  EMS  and  a  more  efficient use of  its ERM  instruments,  especially 
credit  facility  financing,  could  succeed  in  stabilizing  exchange  rates. 
Coordinated  intervention  based  on  commonly  agreed  criteria would  potentially 
achieve  recycling net  capital flows  and  would  publicly prove  the governments' 
determination  to  prevent  artificial  market  pressures  from  threatening  the 
stability of the system. 
Another  more  relevant concern  is that Greece,  having removed  all its exchange 
controls,  would  be  obliged to keep  interest rates at very high  levels in order 
to  secure  the  external  stability  of  the  balance  of  payments,  with  adverse 
effects on  future growth.  While  it is true  that  Greece  will  lose  completely 
its  already  limited  monetary  autonomy,  this  loss  need  not  necessarily  be 
costly for the dom!stic  economy.  It is now  widely recognized  that decisions on 
exchange  rate and  monetary  policy should  be  taken collectively and  be  based  on 
common  choices  and  that  governments  should  take  into  account  the  external 
consequences  of  their  policies.  Interest rate  policy  should  be  coordinated 
with  a  view  to  preserving  exchange  rate  stability  and  to  maintaining  real 
interest rates  within  an  acceptable  range  in  individual  countries  and  across 
the EEC  as a  whole.  In such  a  context Greece  would  be  able to bear the fruits 
of the advantages deriving from  an  integrated European  financial  area,  already 
discussed  in Part I. 
Going  one  step further,  one  could  say that the fact that firms  and  individuals 
will  have  access  to  funds  in  any  Community  currency  and  will  be  able  to 
denominate  their savings in any  of these currencies,  would  stimulate currency 
competition within the EEC,  and  the use  of weak  currencies,  like the drachma, 
would  tend  to  be  eliminated90.  The  DM  might  become  the  hegemonic  currency. 
However,  as  the  experience  of  the  Bretton  Woods  shows,  this would  not  be  a 
desirable development.  Parallel measures would  have  to be  taken to create the 
conditions in which  a  common  European  currency  would  assume  a  central  role in 
the system. 
Vet  the  challenges  for  Greece  arising  from  the  creation  of  a  real  monetary 
union  would  be  considerable.  For  Greece  and  for  the  other  less  prosperous 
Member  States  to be  able to  cope  with  the  increased  strain imposed  on  them  by 
the process of European  monetary  intergration,  a  strengthened EEC-wide  system 
- 73  -of  regional  transfers  would  also  have  to  be  established.  This  would  aim  at 
eliminating  existing  structural  weaknesses  in  these  Member  States  and  at 
safeguarding the social and  economic  cohesion of the Community. 
However,  it is unavoidable  to recognize that the aforementioned  over-ambitious 
objectives could only be  achieved  in the distant future,  since they presuppose 
considerable  further  progress  in  the  field  of  political  integration. 
Nevertheless,  the desire for closer monetary  coordination and  cooperation and 
for  the  creation  of  a  unified  financial  market  in  the  EEC  is  real.  The 
inefficiency  and  limited  effectiveness  of  exchange  controls  is increasingly 
recognized  and  many  Member  States  are  making  rapid  progress  towards 
liberalising capital  flows.  Greece  has not  been  indifferent  to that.  It has 
also  made  some  small  hesitant  steps  towards  relaxing  a  number  of  capital 
movement  controls.  For Greece  to be  able to  proceed  further  in this field,  a 
considerable economic  ~justment effort  is needed.  Economic  policy  will  have 
to play a  central role in this effort. 
- 74  -3  Preconditions for proceeding towards the futher liberalisation 
of capital movements 
From  the  above  analysis  it becomes  obvious  that  Greece  will  not  be  able  to 
comply  with  the  Community  Directives  on  the  liberalisation  of  capital 
movements  unless  it  continues  the  stabilization  effort  initiated  in  October 
1985. 
A deceleration  of  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  drachma  and  its gradual 
stabilization  presuppose  a  considerable  reduction  in  the  rate  of  inflation 
which  remains high  in relation to that of Greece's main  competitors.  However, 
a  firm  exchange  rate  policy  not  accompanied  by  additional  anti-inflationary 
measures  on  all  other  fronts  would  be  biased  against  the  tradeable  goods 
sector and  would  tend to accentuate distortions in the economy.  To  avoid  such 
a  development,  all instruments  of macroeconomic  policy should  be  employed  in 
the  fight  against  inflation.  Overall  nominal  wage  increases  should  be 
moderate.  However,  the sharp reduction  in real disposable  income  during  1986 
and  1987  implies  that  incomes  policy  cannot  continue  to  carry  the  brunt  of 
adjustment.  More  attention  has  to  be  paid  to  financial  policies.  Monetary 
policy should  remain  restrictive.  But  if the burden  of monetary  restraint is 
not to  fall  again  excessively  on  the  private  sector,  public  sector deficits 
will  have  to  be  reduced.  This,  in  turn,  requires  a  sustained  structural 
improvement  in  public  sector  finances  aiming  at  increasing  revenues  and 
limiting expenditures.  On  the revenue  side,  further reforms are needed  towards 
widening  the tax base,  abolishing long-established privileges and  curbing tax 
evasion91  On  the  expenditure  side,  fundamental  reforms  are  required, 
particularly in  the social  security system  so  as  to better  link contributions 
to  benefits,  in  public  sector  employment  with  a  view  to  increasing 
productivity and  reducing overmanning,  and  in subsidies which  remain  large and 
tend  to  create  or perpetuate  economic  inefficiencies.  Important  changes  are 
also  needed  in  the  management  and  structure  of  public  corporations  and 
enterprises.  The  reduction  of  public  deficits  appears  to  be  of  utmost 
importance,  particularly  if  we  take  into  account  that  government  spending 
tends  to  stimulate  imports  and  to  influence  exports  negatively  through 
crowding-out  mechanisms. 
- 75  -However,  a  firm  exchange  rate  policy  can  in  itself  provide  a  powerful 
instrument for the reduction of inflation.  As  inflationary pressures subside, 
the possibility of the drachma  joining the  EMS  should be  seriously considered. 
Other  Member  States'  experience shows  that participation in the  ERM  of the EMS 
can  contribute  significantly  to  the  success  of  domestic  anti-inflationary 
strategies,  thus  facilitating  economic  policy  convergence  in  the  EEC. 
Moreover,  participation in the ERM  could  strengthen investor confidence  in the 
drachma  and  lead  to  increased  capital  inflows  by  both  residents  and 
.d  t  92  non-res1  en  s  . 
As  far  as  interest  rate  policy  is  concerned,  an  improved  management  of 
interest  rates  and  a  more  efficient  implementation  of  monetary  policy 
presuppose  considerable  further  progress  in  reforming  the  financial  system. 
The  persistence of  direct credit  controls deprive  the monetary  authorities of 
the ability to  pursue  a-flexible  monetary  policy,  which  would  be  absolutely 
necessary  under  a  less  restrictive  exchange  control  system.  Therefore, 
efforts to  liberalise interest  rates,  to  eliminate inefficient  direct  credit 
controls,  to  introduce  new  financial  instruments  and  techniques,  and  to 
stimulate  competition  between  financial  institutions should  be  strengthened. 
Measures  should  also  be  taken  to  create  a  forward  market  for the  drachma  and 
to  liberalise  the  foreign  exchange  operations  of  banks.  Progress  in  this 
field  is  made  all  the  more  essential  in  view  of  the  growing  competitive 
pressures  resulting  from  the  process  of  liberalising the  supply  of  financial 
services in the EEC. 
A vital component  of the policy to reform  the financial sector is the adoption 
of measures  for developing  and  strengthening  the capital  market  by  increasing 
the supply  and  demand  of securities  and  by  modernizing  the  organizational and 
institutional framework  of the  ASE93•  These  measures  are ·expected to  provide 
better  financing  instruments  for  enterprises,  to  encourage  savings  by 
developing new  ways  of  placement,  to  reverse capital  flight and  to stimulate 
the  inflow  of  foreign  capital, 
productive  investment. 
thus  increasing  available  resources  for 
However,  financial reform becomes  particularly difficult to  implement  when  the 
PSBR  and  the  inflation  rate  remain  at  high  levels  94.  The  fight  against 
inflation therefore  becomes  of  utmost  importance.  Of  course,  the  economic 
adjustment required to stabilize the economy  is not painless and  costless.  To 
- 76  -minimize  the  costs,  long-term  efforts should  be  undertaken  for expanding  the 
productive  base  of  the  economy.  The  supply  responsiveness  of  the  economy 
should be  improved,  so as to gradually reduce the inelasticity of  imports and 
accommodate  a  sustained  growth  of  exports.  This  latter  is crucial  for  the 
simultaneous  achievement  of  a  moderate  rate  of  GOP  growth  and  a  sustainable 
external  balance.  Again,  however,  we  should  stress  that  the  increase  in 
investment activity  required for  a  growth  in  exports  is unlikely  to  occur  in 
an  inflationary irrational environment. 
Finally,  the  improvement  in  the  business  climate  evidenced  in  1986  and  1987 
should  be  maintained  and  indeed  strengthened  by  reducing  existing rigidities 
in  the  labour  and  goods  markets.  Furthermore,  the  credibility  and 
predictability  of  economic  policy  should  be  enhanced.  This  would  have  a 
favourable  impact  on  investors'  expectations  and  consequently  on  economic 
stability,  and  would  facilitate the restructuring of the economy95. 
In  conclusion,  the  measures  required  for  proceeding  towards  the  further 
relaxation  of  exchange  controls  are  precisely  those  which  are  essential  for 
the  general  economic  progress  of  the  country.  The  implementation  of  the 
aforementioned  recommendations  in  the  fields of  exchange  rate,  monetary  and 
fiscal  policy  will  lay  the  foundations  of  a  stable  economic  environment 
favourable  to  investment  and  of  an  economy  adequately  strengthened  to  cope 
with the challenge of European  financial  integration. 
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rurposc. 
I f.l\·lllJ! rn•,ard ''' rhc Dt.·n  .. ion of II  ~l.tr 19h0 nn rhc- appiK.IItnn to Al1~'·n.1 .tnt! 111  cfw Fn·th:h "'  ,.,._,.,.., 
th·partnH·rn~ of the provi~ion~ nf tht· Trc:'lty concerning c:tpit:ll movements, 
\X!hcn·;t~ rhe .Ht.llrtnH:nt of the nbjn:ttvn, of1hc Trt•;Hy c:~tahlishm~ the:  [ur«'pt::tn E~onornK Conunun-
tty  requm:s the ~rt·ate~r possihlc: irc:nlom of movement of c.:apital bt.>rwecn  Member Stares ;uuJ chcrdore 
the widest and most speedy liberalization of capital movcment!li, 
HAl) :\DlW IT P Till\ DIRLCTI\T. 
A  rt~t·lc  1 
l.  f..,1unhcr \urn o;hall  ~rant .1!1  forl't~ll c:xc.:haugc authors/.lllnll.., r<.·qutrt·J  for tht· conduo;ion "r pt·rfor· 
n~.llh.t' nl tr  .1n' .at lOll!' or for 1ranskr., h-:.·t ween rc-.iJcnts of ~  h·mbt·r Sl ;Itt'!>  111  rt'!>pc.·ct of the.· c•r"·'  I movc.·-
mc:nt.,  o;et  out 11:  l.tst A l'f :\nnc=x I w  this Directive. 
2  Mcmhc-r \r  .He'\ .-.h:tll cnahlr -;uch tran-.ft·rs of capital rn he m.tdt· on the h:1cot~ ol th<.· C\l"h.lnJ.:t' rat<.'  rul-
111~ for  pa,·n~t·nt., rd.nm~ to current lr:ms;H..:tions. 
\X'ht·rl' su  ... :h tr:1nsfcrco arc m:~Jc on a  lon·•~n cxchanJtc market on whu:h the: Ouctu:1110n  olc.·~dt.tn,.:c.· r.tln 
arc not off~etally restricted, this obltgation shall be uken to mean th:u the exch:m~c rate!' .tpplted mu!'>t 
not !>how  an}  appreci3ble and lasting differences from  those  rulin~ for payments rd.mng to current 
transactions. 
1 ne  Monctar~ ComfTlittee shall watch closely the trend of exch:mge rates applied w  such  transfer~ of 
capirai. :md !>h.1ll  report thcrcon co  the  Commi~sion. If the Commission finds th.u th<.·sc  r.llt'' .;how 
appreciable anJ lasung d1fferenccs from those ruling for payments relaung to current  tran~ac.:t1ons, tt 
shall initiate rhc procedure provided for in Article l69.of the Treary. 
( 1)  Text  incorpor~tinCJ  the  amendments  contC\ineci  in  the  Second 
Council  nirective of  18  necember  {63/21/~F.C)  and  in  1\rticle  2() 
of  the  ~~t of  Accession of  22  January  1972  and  in  the  Council 
Directives  85/583/EEC of  20  December  19B5  and.86/566/F.EC  of  17 
November  19~6. 
This  text  is  not  an  official  document.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  new 
Commission  proposal  for  the  full  liberalisation of  capital  movements  implies 
that  there will  be  no  more  need  for  different  lists of  capital  operations. 
Moreover,  according  to  this  proposal  a  number  of  amendments  should  be  made  in 
the  nomenclature. 
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.! Artie/~ 2 
Deleted 
Article 3  ' 
1.  Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States shallarant all foreign exchange authorizations 
required for the conclusion or performance of transactions and for transfers between residents of Mem· 
ber States in respect of the capital movements set our in List 8 .,(Annex I to this Directive. 
2.  When such free movement of  capital might form an obstade to the achievement of the economic poli· 
cy objecrive of a Memb-er State, the latter may maintain or reintroduce the exchanae restrictions on capi· 
tal movement which were oper~tive on the date of entry into force of this Directive (in the case of new 
Member States, the date of accession). It shall consult the Commission on the matter. 
The Commi!~i~ion  !~ihall examine the measures, for coordinating the economic policies of Member States 
which will enahle these difficulties to be overcome and, after consulting the Monetary Committee, shall 
recommend their adoption by the Member States. 
3.  The Commission may recommend that the State in question abolish the exchange restrictions which 
are maintained or reintroduced. 
Artie/~ 4 
The Monetar)' Committee shall examine at least once a year the restrictions which :Jrc applied to the 
capital movemenrs set out in the lists contained in Annex I to this Directive• it shall report to the Com· 
mission reRarding restrictions which could be abolished. 
Article 5 
1  .  The provisions of this Directive shall not restrict the right of Member States to verify the nature and 
genuineness of tranuctions or transfers, or to take all  requisite measures to prevent infringements of 
their laws and regul:.tions. 
2'  The  Uember  States shall  undertake  not  to render  more  difficult 
the autorization procedures  required  on  the date of entry into  force 
of this  Directive.  They  shall simplify as  far  a• pos•ible the 
authorization  and  control  formalities  applicable  to the  conclusion 
and  performance of transactions  and  transfer•  and  •hall where 
necessary  consult one  another with  a  view  to •uch  aimplification. 
3.  ~he  restricr.ion~ on capital movements under the rules for establishment in a Member State sh.1ll  be 
aboll~hed pursu3nt to this. D.ircctive only in so far as it  is incumbent upon rhe  Mem~r  St:ncs to ,:r.1nr 
freedom o( esublashment an  amplcmenution of Anicles 52 to 58 of the Treaty.  • 
Articl~ 6 
Member States shall endeavour not to introduce within the Community any new exchange restriction 
affecting the capital movements that were liberalized ar the date of entry into force of this Directive (in 
the case of new Member States, the date of accession) nor to make existing provisions more restrictive. 
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Member States shall make known to the Commission, not later than three months after the entry into 
ft>rce of this Directive (in the case of new Member States, three months after the date of acceuion): 
(a) the provisions coverning capital movements at the date of  entry into force of this Directive which are 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; 
(b) the provisions adopted in  pursuance of the Dir-=tive; 
(c)  the procedures for implementing those provisions. 
They shall also make known, not later than the time of entry into force thereof, any new measures going 
beyond the obligations of this Directive, and any amendment of. the provisions governing the capital 
movements set out in Listt!  of Annex I to this Directive. 
Article 8 
Dclcoted 
Article 9 
Thi!i  Directive shall  .:~pply without prejudice to the provisions of Aniclcs 67 (2), 68 (3) and 221  of the 
Trc•t:,Y. 
Article JO 
lists A,  B  and C contained in Annex I, together with the Nomenclature of Capital Movements and 
the Explantatory Notes in Annex II, form an intqral pan of this Directive. 
Done at Luxembourg, 11  May 1960. 
For the Council 
Tht Stcrctllry-Ctntrlll  Th~ Prrsidrnt 
CALMES  Eugene SCHAUS 
• 
R7 
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'.1NNEX I 
LIST  A 
Capital  movements  referred  to in  Article  1  of the  Direftive 
Dir~ct  inv~~tment!;  , 
rtcludintt purely fin:uH·ial  investtnt•nrs  nl:tclt·  with a  vit•w  nnly tn ttivinJt  th~ rc-nnns rrnviclinJt 
the capital indirel·t :Kn'Rl'i to the ntnnry nr cnt'ital mnrkrt of anotht'r country, through tlw crra-
tion  of an  undertaking  or  p•nicip:uion  in  an  existin~t  unden1king  in  that  country 
Liquidation  of direct  investment~  II 
Heed ins 
Admission  of  an  unrlcrraking'!;  llccuritit·~  tC'  tlw  capital  n1arkct 
Shares and otht·r !'iecuritirs of a  partidp:uin~-t nature, dnlt iu an nr in thr prtK't'SI\ c,f  intn,.lu,·tion 
to  a  !Clock  t•xdt;tn~t·  in  a  Mc·mlwr  Stall· 
Ill A I  and  2 
Ill 8  I  and  2 
llonds dc:th in on or in  the rroct•s:; of inrroc.ludit'ln to i1  stc,~k exchange in a Mcmhcr Statt· 
UniL'i  of  undert:lking~ for  collective  investment  in  tr:tnstcrablr securities covered  by  Dirl'ctive 
llS/61 1/EEC (').without prejudice to the provisions of that Directive relating to the marketing of 
UCITS  units  (Sectif'n  VIII) 
Opcr:ttion!'i  in  sccuriltt·~ 
shar~s and  otht'r  securities  C'f  a  parrkip:llin~  naturt· 
bonds 
units  of  collectJVt'  rnvcslnll'nl  undc·rtakin,l!~ 
unit!'  of  c:nlf,_., '"'t'  lll\'t'SinH·nl  tlltdt•r!aktn1!"  tlt·ah  i11  1111  :1  !'ll'ldt  cuhan~t· 
units  not  dc;~l~  in  on  n  srod  cxchan~e 
of  undertakin~ for collective inve5tmcnt  in transfl'rable  securiti~s covered by  Directive 
8.~/h II  /F.EC 
nf  nrh..r  c~ilt'I.'IIVl'  invt·~tnwnt  11ndc·rtak.in~!i  tht·  ~ole ohjn·t  tlf  which  is  invcstlllt·nt  in 
tran~f,.rnbl~  M  '-untie"  or  otht•r  asst'tl'  the  :tl..'quisition  of which  h.1s  been  liht•rali:,•d 
Investment~~;  in  real  t·~t:~tc 
Grant  and  rcp:1ymen1  pf  crl·dit~  in  t·nr!IW!'Itnn  with  l·omnrt·rdal  transactions  or  the  provisum  of 
services  in  which  a  rc!.idcnt  •~  parti<.:ipntm,!:! 
Penonal  capit:.l  mnvcrnt'nt~ 
rv 
v 
VIII A  and  B 
Gifto;  and  cndo~·mcnts  X B 
Dowries  XC 
lnheritanCt"~  X IJ 
Settlemt'nt  of  clrbt~  rn  thc·tr  ~.·otllltrtt''  of  onr,in  hy  imnu1~r::mts  X  E 
Tr:msfers  X F 
Transfers  of  c•pir:tl  lwlonpm~ to  emr.~:ranrs  returnin,:  to  their  countries  of  origin  X G 
Transfers  of  worker~· !i:tvings  during  their  period~ of  5tl'l\  X H 
Transfer.;  by  instalments of blocked  funds  hdon~in~ to  non-resident" hy  th~ holdt·r.; •f such 
fundo;  in  ca•.t·  Cll  .• , .. ·nat  hard:;hil'  X I 
Annual transfers of blncked  funds  to another Member Statt·  by a non-n:sidt·nt account holder. 
up. to  an  amounr  or  proportion  of  the  total  assets.  fixetl  uniformly  by  the  Member  St:.tes 
_ concerned  for  all  applicants  X L 
..  .. Transfers  abroad  of  minor  amount.~ 
·,• .. :  Trmsfers  in  performance  of  in1urnnce'  contracts 
XM 
XI 
"'~- ...... 
• 
1 
IS  and when  freedom  of  movement  in  respect  of  servicetc  is  extended  to  those  contract~ in 
implrmentation  bf  Aniclc:s  W  tl uq. o(  the  Treaty 
(')'Council Directive  8.~/611/E.EC of 20  December 198' on the coordin;,tion of laws.  rcJUiations and administrative provisions relatins to undtn.akinp for 
~oll«tive inYHtment  in  transferable  S«Urities  (UCITS).  OJ  No  l  .li.~.  Jl.  12.  198.~. p.  3  . 
·  ..  - 94-Sureties,  oth~r guarant~c!l  and  rights  of  pl~dgt" :tml  tnnsfen  conn~ctect"with them  n:l•tina to 
credits in connection with comm~rciel transaC'tions or the provision of .ervice~ in which a reai-
d~nt ;,.  r•rticiplltin~ 
Ions-term  loan~  with  a  vkw  to  c,;tahli$hins:  nr  maintaining  la.,ting  economi"  linb 
Other capital  movements 
Death  duties 
Damages (when·  tht'lle  can  be  consid,·red  all  ,::trital)  , 
Refundtt in case11  of rht'  cancellation of  contra~o.·t• and refund• of uncalled-for ptyments (where 
rhett'  can  ht- t·nn!lidcrcd  u  capit:•l) 
Authors'  royalties 
Patents,  design!'.  trade  marks  end  inventions  (assipment  and  tnnsfers  erisinc  out  of such 
usignments) 
Trtndcn of  tlu·  mnnt·y!l  n·quirt·tl  fnr  tlw  rwvi,.ion  of M·rvit·cs 
XII A and 8 in conjunction with 
VIII A  1nd  8 
XII A and ll in conjunction with 
IAJ 
83 
XIV A 
XIVB 
XIVC 
XJVD 
XIV F. 
·n,e use of the rrnc.:c·ctl11  of the liquidation of :t5Sl'l'- abroad bclon«ins 10 rnidcnts must be:  permitted at leut within the limill of the obli· 
sations  as  rrg:trds  liberalization  accepted  b)'  M~o.·mbcr States. 
liST D 
.... 
Capital  n1ovements  refen-ed  to in  Article 3 of the  Directive 
Admi!l!lion  of an  undrrtakin,~t'!l  !lt'CUritir~  It' tlw  npital  m:ukt't 
Shares end other !iccuriticl' of a  pnrticipatintt nature, not dealt in on or in the proces!l  of intro· 
duction  to  a  stock  eoxdtnn~t'  in  n  M~·mht'r State 
1\nncb nne  clf':tlc  in nn "' 111  till' prcH'c'S'- nf intrnchlt'tinn In :t  Ntnd,  nt·han~ec· in :1  Mrmlwr State 
llnit!l  of  collective  invc!ltmcnt  undt"rt:tkin~  not  covcrt·d  by  Directive  R.~/611/EEC 
Operations  in  securiticl' 
Units, not dealt in  on  a  stock  exchan~c. of collective:  investment undertakings not covered by 
Directive  11.~/611/EF.C. rlw  !~Oit'  ohtcl'l  of whid• is  nor  inv\'l'tmt'nt  in  trandcrahlc 5C\.'Uritic:!l  or 
orher  a!tsel'  the  a'-quisirinn  of  whic.:h  h01!>  hc·cn  lih('r:di~t·,l 
Grant  and  repayment  of  mt·dium- nntl  lon~·trrm t'redit!l  in  connection  with  commercial  tnn!l· 
actions or the  provision  of servicet  in  which  no  resident  it~  participating 
Grant and repayment of medium- and lontt·tcrm lo:ans and credits not in connection with commer-
cial  tranMctions  or  the  provssion  of  services 
Surl"tit"~, otht"r ~u:mmtc·t<N :m,l  ri~-:hts ul  plc.·cl~c· ancltransflors c.·onnc.-c.:tcd  with them and rel:atin,tu: 
medium- and long-term credits in connection with commercial transactions or the provi!lion of 
services  in  which  no  resident  is  participatinr, 
medium- and  lon!t-term  loan5 and  credit!~ not in connt'ction with commercial tr:ansactions or 
the  provision  of  servicc5 
Ill A I  and  2 
Ill 8  I  ami  ! 
IV 
Vll2 
A (ii)  and  (iii) 
B (ii)  and (iii) 
VIII 
A (ii)  and (iii} 
R (ii)  and  (iii} 
XII A and  B 
in  conjunction  with 
VII 2  A (ii)  and  (iii) 
B (ii)  and (iii) 
XII A end  8 
in  conjunction  with 
VIII  A (ii)  and  (iii) 
B (ii)  and (iii) 
The use of  th~ proceeds of the liqui,tation of  as~t'lr. 11hroad  belonging to residents must be permitted at leest within the limiu oi the obli· 
ptions as  re~:trd~  ril•cr:tlizati~n  •n:t"ptc·d  hy  "'h·rnhcr 5tnlc.'s. 
------- -------------
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LIST  C 
Carital  nuwC'mC'nt!l  referred to  i~  Artid('  4  of thC'  Dire<"thre 
Shnrt-tt'rm  invr~rmrnt~ in  trrn~ury ~ill~ :md otlwr "''''uritiC'~ normally dult in on tht' mnnt'Y markt't 
Opening and  plnrinF  of  fund~ on current or dl·po!>it  accounts, repatriation or u5t'  of balances on 
current  or depo!;it  accounL;;  with  credit  in~titutions 
Grant  and  rern\'lnl'nl  nf  ~hort-trrm  cretiit!l  in  nHtnectie>n  with  c~mmerc:ial  lran~action~ or  the 
provision  of  scrvu.:cs  111  which  no  rcsu.knt  i10  p.trtidt'alintt 
Grant  and  repayment  of  !~hort·tcrm  loans and nc·diL;;  not in connection with  ,·ommercial trana-
action•  or  the  rruvl!lion  nf  lt'rvicc~ 
Personal  capital  movements 
lo•ns 
Sureties,  other  ~unrnntt>c•s  and  ri~ht1 of  plc-d~r  :md  transfcn&  connect~ with  lhC'm  relating  to 
shntl·lt•rrn  nc·tfit:-;  111  I"UUUl'('fiUII  with  C:Untllll'l\'inJ  tr:ti11M.1ion!>  Of  thC'  rrovi~iun of  ~rviCr!C in 
whkh  no  rt•stdc•nl  IS  f':lrttc:iratilllt 
llhort-tC"rm  loans 11ntl  nnlirs nol in t·nnm·d•on with  nJmntt'rd~l tmns~ction!i nr lhc provi5ion of 
llt:rvic~s 
privRte  loan!\ 
Physical  import  :mel  export  of  fin~nci:tl  :tsscts 
Oth~r carit:tl  nHlV!'Inl'lll:;:  Misccll:ant•ou  .. 
--------.---------------
ANNE.X II 
NOMENCLA11JRE OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
I.  DIRECT INVESTMENTS' 
A.  Direct investments orr narioMI territory by  non-r~sicl~nts' 
VI 
IX 
VII  :!  A (i) 
n (i) 
VIII  A  (i) 
8  (i) 
XA 
X  II  A and R in conjunction with 
VII  2  A  (i) 
n (i) 
XII  A and n  in conjunction with 
VIII  A (i) 
B  (i) 
XII  A and  B in conj8nction with 
XA 
XIII 
XJV  F' 
1.  Establishment and extension of branches of new undertakings belonging solely to the person provid-
ing the capital, and the acquisition in full of existing undertakings 
2.  Participation in new or exiSting undertakings with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting ceo-
nomic links  • 
J.  Long-t~rm loans with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting economic links 
4.  lteinvestiMftt of profits with a view to maintaininglasring economic links 
I.· Direct investments abrot~cl by r~sidcnu' 
1.  Establishment and extension of branches or new undertakings belonaing solely to the person provid-
ina the capital, and the acquisition in full of existing undertakings 
2.  Participation in new or existing undertakings with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting eco-
nomic links 
J.  Long-term loans with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting economic links 
4.  lleinvestment ~f profits with a view to maintaining lasting economic links 
I  5ft ,............,. NoM,,  .••.  ,  . 
·· .. 
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A.  Repatriatiorr of  the proc.eeds of the liquidation' of  dired irrvestmerrts orr Mtio1111l territory by norr-
residertts 
1.  Principal 
2.  Capital appreciation 
B.  Use of the proceeds of  liquidatiort of  direct investments abroad by residents  , 
1.  Principal 
2.  Capital appreciation 
Ill.  ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO THE CAPITAL MARKET 
A.  Atlmissiorr of  securities of  a domestic undertaking to aforeigrr capitlll market 
1.  Introduction' on a foreign stock exchange 
(a) of shares and other securities of a panicipating nature 
(b) of bonds 
(i)  denominated in national currency 
(ii)  denominated in foreign currency 
(cl  units of collective  investment  underta~inge 
2.  Issue and placing' on a foreign capital market 
(a) of 5hares and other securities of a panicipating nature 
(b) of bond.; 
(i)  d~nomin:u~d in  nation:tl c:urrc:ncy 
(ii)  denominated in foreign currency 
8.  Admission n(  ucuriti~s of  a jorr1g, urtd~rtakirrR to a domt"stic  capit&~l '"'"krt 
l.  Introduction on a domestic stock exchange 
(a) of shares and other securities of a panicipating nature 
(b) uf bonds 
(i)  denominated in national currency 
(ii)  denominated in foreign currency 
(c)  units of collective  inveatment undertaking• 
2.  !ssue and placing on a domestic capital market 
(a) of shares and other securities of a panicipating nature 
(b) of bonds 
(i)  denominated in national currency 
(ii)  denominated in foreign currency 
(c)  units of collective  investment  undertaking• 
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• C.  Ad,i.uimt of  dom~stic  securiti~s of  th~ public s~ctor to afor~iRn capital  mark~t pursu.mtlo Art1d~ 
68 {J) of  thr Tr~11ty  · 
l.  fntrotfuction of  sccuririe~ on :1  foreicn stoclc exchange 
(:e)  dennmin:ued in narion:d currency 
{b) denominated in roreign currency 
2.  ~~~ur :md rlacin~ of  securitit'~ on :1  (orciRn C:tpital marL:t't 
(:t) dcnorn•n:HC'd in national currt'ncy 
(h) rfr.nonun.urcf in forc:i.:n (urrrncy 
, 
n.  AtlmtHmn offor,.;R, St'r'llritit·~ n( tht tmblic s•t:tor to tl tlumt"stic· ('.lfiiiJI ,.~,~,.,pursuant In A  ,,,c~,. 
68 (.l  J of ,,.,,.  Treaty 
J.  lnr roducr•on of  sec:uritit'~ on :1  tiomcsri.: stocL: exchanttc: 
(:I) dcnomin:ued in nationnl currcnC)' 
(b) dc:nnm•n:ued in foreign currency 
2.  h~uc .md rl:u:ing of sccurittc-s nn :1  donu:stic cnpital rn;uL:ct 
(a} denomm:Htd in narion:tl currC'ncy 
IV.  OPERATIONS IN SECURITIES' (not included under I. II  :~nd Ill) 
A .  .A.cqu:sltt''" by  non-r~sid~nts of  dom~stic  s~curiti~s'  d~alt in on a stock ~xchangt'  and  r~patriation of 
th~  procr~ds nfliquidatron the,n( 
(a) quorrd' 
(b) unquoted' 
1.  Acqui~Jtinn of shares' :1nd other securities of a paniciparinJt n3turc 
2.  Repatriation -:;,(the proceeds of liquidation of shares and other securities or a panicipating nature 
J.  Acquiminn of bonds' 
(i)  dennmm:ued in n:nion:1l currc:ncy 
(ii)  denomin:ued in foreign currency 
4.  Repatriation of the proceeds o; f  uidation of bonds. 
5.  Acquisition of units of collective inveatment  undertakings 
6.  Rep~tri~tlon of  tho  pr~ceod• of  the  liquidation or unlta of 
collective  inveatment  undertakin9a 
B.  Acquisition  by  resirlents  of  foreign  aecruities dealt  in  on  a 
stoc~  ~xchange,  or of dome1tic  aecuritiea  iaauod  on  a  foreign 
market  but  non  deftlt  in  on  a  atoc~ eachan9e,  and  ua•  of  the 
proce~ds of  the  liquidation thereof 
(a) quoted 
(b) unqunrrd 
1.  Acqui~irion of sh:tres :md mhcr ~ecurirics of a participating n:nure  • 
• 
2.  Usc: o( the proceeds of liquidation of shares and other securitie~ of a  rarticip:uin~ nature 
3.  Acqui~itinn of bond~ 
(i)  dc:nomin:erc:d  in nnrion:1l currency 
(ii)  denomin;nc:d in  fnrci~n cur~~ncy 
4.  Usc of the proceeds of liquid:.rion of bonds 
..  , ......  -·  .. . 
5.  Acq11~~ition of units  ~f collective  inveatment  undertakings 
6.  tr•e  cJ(  the  proceede  ~f the  liquidation of units of collective 
investment  undertakings 
I  .....  '  \fl  •.  l ..  otlhl'  f' •'  t~'  •t•  'f' tt'l 
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C.  Acquisition by rrorr-usiderrts of  domestic securities not dealt in on a stock exchange and ,epat,iatio, 
of  the p,ocuds of  liquidation the,eof 
1.  Acquisition of shares and other securities of a panicipating nature 
2.  Repatriation of the proceeds of liquidation of shares ~nd  other securities of a panicipating nature 
3.  Acquisition of bonds 
(i)  denominated in national currency 
(ii)  denominated in foreign currency 
'  4.  Repatriation of the proceeds of liquidation of bonds 
5.  Acquisition of units of collective investment undertakings 
6.  Repatriation of the  proceeds of the  liquidation of unita of 
collective investment undertaking• 
D.  Acquisition  by residents of foreign  securities not dealt in on  a 
stock  exchange,  or of domestic aecuritiea  issued on  a  foreign 
market  but  not dealt  in on  a  atock exchange,  and  uee of the 
proceeds of the  liquidation thereof 
l .  Acquisition of shares and other securities of a panicipating nature 
2.  Uitl· of the proceeds of liquidation of shares and other securities of  :1  participarinR nature 
J.  Acqui!:ition of bonds 
(i)  dencmmated in national currency 
(ii)  denominated in foreign currency 
4.  Use of the proceeds of liquidation of bonds 
5.  Acquisition of units of collective investment  undertakings 
6.  Use  of  the proceeds  of the  liquidation of units of collective 
investment  undertakings 
E.  Physical mouemerrts of  sec-11rities 
1.  Belonging to non-residents 
(a)  import 
(b)  expon 
2.  Belonging to residents 
(a)  import 
{b)  export 
V.  INVESTMENTS IN REAL ESTATE  1 (not included under I and II) 
A.  lnuestm~rrts irr  ,eal estate orr national te,ritory by PIOPI-,esidePits a,J ,.patriJtiurr fJjth,· J"oc1•1•Js of 
/iquid11tion thereof 
1.  Acquisition of real estate 
2.  Repatriation of the proceeds of liquidation of real estate 
B.  IPiuestments in res/ estate t~br011d by residents 11nd use of  the proceeds of  liquidation the,eof 
J •  At"IJH!dtion of real estate 
2.  Use of the proceeds of liquidation of real estate 
- 99-VI.  SHORT-TERM  INVEST~tENTS IN TREASURY  BILLS  AND OTHER SECURITIES NOR-
MALLY DEAlT IN ON THE MONEY MARKET 
I. Denominated in national currency 
2.  Denominated in foreign currency 
A.  Short-urm  inv~stm~nts by non-residents on a domestic money market and repatriation of the pro-
ceeds of  liquidation thereof 
(a)  by natural persons' 
(b)  by legal persons' 
other than financial  , 
institutions 
{~}  b;.  financi:al institutions' 
8.  Short-tPrm inv.:stments by residents on a foreign money market and use of  the proceeds ofliquidc~­
tion thereof 
(:1)  hy n:uural rcr~ons
1 
(b)  by legal persons' 
uthc:r th:1n financial 
institutions 
(c)  by financial institutions• 
VII.  GRANTING  AND  REPAYMENT OF CREDITS  RELATED TO COMMERCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS OR TO PROVISION OF SERVICES 
1.  In  which  :1  resident is participating 
l.  In which no resident is participating 
A.  Crt!dtU  ~rantf'd by non-rt!sid~nts to residents: 
(i) shnrt-rerm (less than one year) 
(ii) medium-term (from one to five years) 
(iii) long term (five years or more) 
(a)  by n:lfural persons 
(h)  hy  lcg:~l persons  l 
mher than fin:anci:al 
institutions 
(c)  by  financial institutions 
B.  Cr~dit., Kr,mlt.'d by reSJdntts to non-rcsid,nts: 
(i) short-term (less than one ye:u) 
(ii) medium-term ((rom one to five years) 
(iii) long-term (five years or more) 
(a)  hy  n:llur:ll penons 
(b)  by  legal persons  I 
other than financial 
institutions 
(c)  b) financial institutions 
VIII.  GRANTING AND RErAYMENT Of LOANS AND CREDITS NOT RELATED TO COM-
MERCIAL TRANSACTIONS OR TO PROVISIONS OF SERVICES (nor fncluded under I and X) 
A.  Loans and acdits grantrd by non-resid~nts to rcsidr.nts: 
(i} !>hort·ff'rm (le!\5 th:tn onr year) 
(ii) medium-tC"rm (from one to five  y~r.s). 
(iii) long-term (five years or more) 
- 100  -(:1)  hy  n:uur:'ll  ~rsons 
(b)  h)'  lcr.:al  p~rson:-; 
(c)  by  financial institutions  t 
oth~r rhan financial 
institutions 
' 
B.  Loans and credits granted by residents to rrorr·residerrts: 
(i)  short·t~rm (less than one year) 
(ii) medium-term (from one to five years) 
(iii) long-term (five years or more) 
(a) by natural p~rsons 
(b) by leg:al persons 
(c)  by financial institutions 
t  other than financial 
(  institutions 
IX.  OPENING AND PlACING OF FUNDS ON CURRENT AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS 
REPATRIATION OR  USE  Of BALANCES ON CURRENT OR  DEPOSIT  ACCOUNTS WITH 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS' 
A.  By non-residents &llith domr.stic credit institutions 
J.  Account~ and bal3nce~ in n:nional currency 
2.  Accounts and balances in foreign currency 
(a) by natural persons  (  other than financial 
(b) by  leg:~l persons  (  institutions 
(c)  by finotncial institution5 
8.  By  resid~nts with foreign credit institutions 
1.  Accounts and balances in national currency 
2.  Account5 and balances in foreign currency 
(a) by natural p~rsons  I  other than financial 
(b) by legal persons  institutions 
(c)  by financial institutions 
X.  PERSONAL CAPITAl MOVEMENTS (not covered by the other seaions) 
A.  Loans 
1 .  loans granted by non-residents to residents 
2.  loan~ ttranred by  r~5id~nu ro non-re5idenu 
8.  G~(ts and endowments 
C.  Dowries 
' Srr £;rf!l•""'n"" Notn, pp.  91·99. 
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• D.  lnhrrrltm(r.~ 
E.  SC'ttlrm.·ntof  dt~/tu in tiJt•ir ,.,llmtr)' of  origin by immigrants  , 
F.  Traru(r.,.s n(  c-apital belonginR to residents who ~nugrat~ and are: 
1.  N:uion:~l.; of the: country in quc.-stion 
2.  Nationals of other countries 
G.  Transfns o{  r.apital hrlon~ing ,,, emigrants rrturning In th,•ir ,·namtr,• nf  nriRin 
H.  Transf~rs of  worlt~rs'  savings during their period of  stay 
I.  Trans{rrs I'Y instalment ofiJ/od::rd  .fimtls bf.'lonRinx to nm•-rrsit/,•,ts b~· thr hoMas o/ su,·lt /1111ds ;, 
cau of  spee~al hardship 
L.  Annual trans/ns of  bloclt.cd funds to anothu Member StaU by a non-resident accmmt-holdrr, up to 
an amount or a percentage of the total assets, fixed uniformly by the Mernber StaU concerned .for all 
applicants  · 
M.  Trans/ns of minor anrmmts a"road 
XI.  TRANSfERS IN PERFORMANCE OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
A.  Prrmtum.' .md  ,,,z~•mt•nl$ m  rt'SfJt•c·t of  li{r assurancr 
I.  Cnntr:.cu cnnchulcd herwct.·n dornc.· .. rk life :t!l!Sur:tncc: cornranic.·s :mJ nun-rc.·sidc:nts 
2.  Contr:tcu concluded hcrwccn for('iJ!n life :1!lsurancr cornp:1nics .tnc.J  rc:~oitlcnts 
8.  Premiums and payments in respect of  credit insurance 
1.  Contract!\ concluded between domestic credir insurance comp~nic!l :1nd  non-resident!'; 
2.  Contr:tct!f; concluded between forci~n credit insurance comp~nie!> :tnd rc!>ident~ 
C.  Otho tr.m.<lr·r.~ u{  c:clflll~l ;, rt'Sflr'c  I uf  imurant"t' etmlrtlt'U 
XII.  SURETIES. OTHER GUARANTEES AND RIGHTS OF PLEDGE AND TRANSFERS REI.AT-
INGTOTHEM  • 
A.  Granted by non-residrnts to residr.ffts 
8.  Granted hy residt•nts to non-residents 
XIII.  IMPORT AND EXPORT OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 
A  . •  ~curitics (not included under IV) ,,d  mt'ans of  paymt'nl o.f t'Vt'ry kind 
B.  Gold 
97 
- 102  -
·· .. 
..... --........ ... XIV. ·OTHER CAPITAl. MOVEMENTS 
A.  (),-.1th  duti~s 
, 
B.  iJ,tnJaRt<s  (wh~r~  th~u  t'an  b~  cnnsiJ~rcd  as capital) 
(..;.  R  c']rmds  i11  the: t'fiSt: uf  ,.,,,·c'ildtWII uf  c:•mtrdt'IS .m,/ rt'/1,,/~ ·~f ""'  d/l,·,l·jtJr I'"Y"'''"b ( whae• the·~·· 
can be~ nmsrdt!rcd as capit11l) 
D.  Author's royalties 
l',uc·llt\, tlt·•,iJlll\, lrihlr nuua., ilflll im•rneion1 
f :1Utf!lltnrnl' ;uul I t1utdrr~; '"'""'- tttll uf •ttdt sn~iiUttnrnt'  I 
1::.  l'r.tns.ft•rt. uj thr mmtc·y~ , .  ..,,,,.,/Jot tht•  prur•rurHr~ uj ~e·tt·~t o  1  ""' "''  lu,J.·,I Uth.lc·t  I X 1 
F.  M l$c:rlltJnr.ous 
EX PLANA TORY NOTES 
Drr~ct int•r.stm,.,rts 
lnv~~tmt'nt"' of all  kind!~ hy  n:'lfur:1l  J't'r!lnn~ nr cnmmr:rci:~l, indu!ltrial or financial  und~rtalcinG"· 1nd which 'lierve to 
~ ""'='"""., "' '"  m;tmt~tn l:t'itinJ: ;uul ,lirC't:t  link' ht't~'t't'n tht' rrnnn rnwi.ltntc thr \::trn.tl ;tn.t tht' t'ntrcorrconrur  tn 
whnnt ur thr undc:rtakm~ tu wludt the: c.:;tf'lt:tltll tn:tdc.· av:ail.ahlt' m uhl&:r tn ~.trr)· nn .an''"""'""~ '''''"'II\'. ·atu, ""'· 
cert must therefore be uncJcrsuKl\1 in its wicJc:Jt  sense. 
The:  undc:rt:tking~ mentioned under  I  include lecally indepc"ndent  undertakincs (wholly·owntd subsidiaries) and 
hranchr~. 
As rcg;trch thuM: undcrt:tlcingo; mentioned under 2 which havt the: st.llu!o uf \:umpanies ltmuccJ b)·  !Ohare:!-, thc:re ts par· 
ricipation in the nature of direct investment where the block of shares held by a natural person or another underuk· 
ing or any ather holder enables the ~h:areholder, either pursuant to the provisions of nation:al laws rcl:ating to com· 
panie!l ltmitt'd by  ~harts or otherwi!tt', to participate effectively in the management of the company or in it!\ c:nntrnl. 
lnn~t·term luan!t uf a roarridp;uing n;uurc:, mentioned under .1. mc:tn ln:ans for a ~riud  uf more: th.an hH· ~·e.tr!l whe~h 
are  m:~dc fur  the purpose of est:~blishing or m:~intaininc lasting economic links. The main eumples ~  ht'h m;t)'  be 
cited oar~ lo.ms gr:~nrcd  b~· a company to its subsidiaries or to companies in which it has a share. and loans linked with 
a profiHiharintt arrangcmtnt. Loans granted by financial institutions with a view to C5tablishing or maintainang last· 
in,; economic linlcs :arc also included under this headinc. 
• 
Natur:tl and legal persons according to the ddinitions laid down in the exchange control regulations m furt:c rn c:u:h 
Mr:mbt-r State.  · 
·.  ·  .. ·Pma•t'd.( olliqu1datrrm (o( invescm~nu.  sccuricie~. etc.) 
Prnc:«d' of sale. amnunr of rcpnymcnt!\, prnc~rds of execution·,( jud~mcnu,  etc. 
,,,,.,Jr,,.,,,,, "" tl Cllll. ,.,., ,.,,R,. 
The :hlllli!>!itlln nf ~curitic:s- in ;u:ccml:anL't: with :t srcc.:ific:t.f prnc.:c.lur('- ,.,  dc::llm~s un ;t St&t\:k cxdl.UIJ:t:.  whc.·clu~r 
cnntrulled officially or unofftciall)·, and their admission ro public sale. 
9R 
- 1CJ  -
·  .. • 
~curitics tlt!alt in orr a stud uchanR~  (quoted or unquot~) 
Securities the dealin~~ tn which are controlled by regulations, the prices for which :ue regularly published, either by 
official stock exchanges (quoted securities) or by other bodies ltrached to 1  sroclc  rxchanae - e.a. commirr~s ol 
banks (unquoted securities). 
PlacinR of  Sl'curitu~!f 
The  dir~ sale of ~curitie~ by  the iuuer, or sale rhcreo( by the c:onsorrium which the issuer has instruct~d to tiC' II 
them. 
Opt>rations in srcuritrr.s 
Any  A~1lings in securities, including the initial sale of units by unit rrusrs. 
, 
Sccunucs accurJm~ to rhc: cuunlry in whi,:h the issuer has hi1 principal place uf bu1incu. 
Shares 
Include rishts ro  !uh~cribe for new issues of shares. 
Ronda 
Negotiable  secutiries  with  a  maturity  of  two  years  or  more  from 
issue  for  which  the  interest rate  and  the  terms  for  the  repayment  of 
the principal  and  the  payment of interest are determined  at  the  time 
of  issue.  The  bonds  referred  to  in  category  IV  of  the  Nomenclature 
are  those  i~sued by  both  public and  private bodies. 
Collective  investment  undcrta~inge 
Undertakings: 
the object of which  is  the  collective  investment  in  transferable 
securities  or  other  assets  of  the  capital  they  raise  and  which 
operate  on  the  principle of  rie~-spreadin9,  and 
the  units  of  which  are,  at  the  request  of  holders,  under  the 
legal,  contractual  or  statutory  conditions  ~overning  thom, 
repurch;ucd  or  redeemed,  directly  or  indirectly,  out  of  thoao 
undertakins'  assets.  Action  taken  by  a  collective  investment 
undertaking  to ensure  that  the  stock  exchange  value  of its units 
does  not  significantly  vary  from  their  net  asset  value  ehall  be 
re~~rc1~t1  lilA  e<1uiv~  1  P.nt.  tn  •uch  ropurchnee  or  re,trmrtinn. 
Such  undert~kings  may  b~  constitutec1  according  to  law  either  under 
the  law  of  contract  (as  commond  funds  mana9ed  by  management 
companies)  or  trust  law  (as  unit  trusts)  or  under  statute  (as 
investment  companies). 
F'or  the  purposes  of  thit!!  Oircctive  "common  funds"  shall also  include 
unit  trusts. 
Natural or lt'Ral prr5ons 
As defined hy the n:uional rules.  • 
Fllfancial institutions 
Banks, S3ving h:anh :tnd institutions speci.:~lizing in  the provision of short  mt'tfiltm  :1n~• 1  -•·  -•  . 
rante com  ·  b  'ld'  ·  ·  .  •  ·  u  nnJ:-It'rm creun, anu  rn~u·  pantes,  ut  rng SOCtetres, tnvcsrment companies and ocher institutions o( hkc character.  · 
Credit institllttons 
Banks, Savina banks and insrirutionl sreaalizing in the provision o( shon  m•d'  d I  ,.  •  ~  tum an  ona·tt"rm '-"'~''If  . 
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